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349 
BIG DATA DISCRIMINATION: 
MAINTAINING PROTECTION OF 
INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY WITHOUT 
DISINCENTIVIZING BUSINESSES’ USE  
OF BIOMETRIC DATA TO ENHANCE 
SECURITY 
Abstract: Biometric identification technology is playing an increasingly signifi-
cant role in the lives of consumers in the United States today. Despite the benefits 
of increased data security and ease of consumer access to businesses’ services, 
lack of widespread biometric data regulation creates the potential for commercial 
misuse. Of particular concern is the use of biometric data by businesses, such as 
those within the data broker industry, to enable opaque discrimination against 
consumers. Although some states, such as Illinois, Texas, and Washington, have 
adopted comprehensive biometric data regulation statutes, the statutes do not of-
fer a consistent approach. This Note argues that Congress should consider enact-
ing a comprehensive statute. The industry-specific approach to privacy regulation 
of federal law, however, may leave regulation up to the states. Therefore, as more 
states look to regulate businesses’ collection and use of biometric data, they 
should enact statutes that seek to balance protecting consumers’ biometric data 
from discriminatory use and businesses’ use of biometric data to enhance security 
and provide improved products and services. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2017, Stanford University researchers published a study detailing the 
creation of a facial recognition algorithm that was able to predict an individu-
al’s sexual orientation with startling accuracy.1 The researchers took 35,000 
photographs of self-identified homosexual and heterosexual individuals from 
public dating websites.2 The algorithm was designed to make the assumption 
that hereditary and personal grooming features, such as weight, hairstyle, and 
facial expressions, were proxies for sexual orientation.3 The study was criti-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Heather Murphy, The ‘Gaydar Machine’ Causes an Uproar, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2017, at 
D1 (detailing the method and results of a study that correctly predicted sexual orientation based upon 
a single photograph of an individual at a rate of 71% for females and 81% for males). 
 2 See id. (noting that the images used in the study were taken from online dating profiles and were 
only images of white individuals). 
 3 See id. (stating that the study’s researchers, Dr. Kosinski and Mr. Wang, created the algorithm 
to correlate genetic facial features and an individual’s personal “grooming choices” to be used as 
proxies, or substitutes for sexual orientation). 
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cized for the creation of a tool that collected data to categorize individuals 
based on sexual orientation and therefore had the potential to be used to ex-
clude or discriminate against entire classes of individuals.4 
Beyond concerns of potential discriminatory practices associated with the 
algorithm in the Stanford study, there is a growing fear of more widespread 
discrimination which could result from businesses’ manipulation of biometric 
identification data.5 In the past decade, businesses have implemented biometric 
identification technology to both ease consumer access to businesses’ services 
and for use in security and fraud prevention measures.6 Although there are cur-
rently no reports of businesses actually using an algorithm like the one created 
at Stanford, businesses routinely collect data sufficient to run such an algo-
rithm through their use of biometric identification technology.7 Despite this 
increase in collection of individuals’ biometric data, there is no comprehensive 
regulation of businesses’ collection, use, and disclosure of biometric data in the 
United States.8 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See id. (reporting critics’ fears that sexual-determination technology could be used to discrimi-
nate); see also Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 
671, 677 (2016) (affirming data mining’s potential to segregate individuals within historically protect-
ed classes through automated processes); Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., Open Data, Privacy, 
and Fair Information Principles: Towards a Balancing Framework, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 2073, 
2091–93 (2015) (analogizing data brokers’ collection and use of consumer data to the surveillance 
industry’s practice of “social sorting” because both create potentially detrimental categorizations of 
individual data). 
 5 See Eduard Goodman, Biometrics Won’t Solve Our Data-Security Crisis, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(Dec. 6, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/12/biometrics-wont-solve-our-data-security-crisis [https://perma.
cc/76C7-WVBQ] (noting that biometric technology can collect personal information such as race, 
gender, age, economic class, or health conditions, and thus it could be used to engage in discriminato-
ry social sorting by segregating individuals through automated processes). 
 6 See Xavier Larduinat, 3 Ways Biometric Technology Will Change the Face of Financial Ser-
vices, GEMALTO BLOG (Jan. 2, 2018), https://blog.gemalto.com/financial-services/2018/01/02/3-
ways-biometric-technology-will-change-face-financial-services/ [https://perma.cc/45MV-WJ47] (at-
tributing the increase in biometric technology to the dual benefits of increased security measures and 
ease of consumer access to businesses’ services and products); Robinson Meyer, Who Owns Your 
Face?, THE ATLANTIC (July 2, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/07/how-
good-facial-recognition-technology-government-regulation/397289/ [https://perma.cc/TH9N-92DP] 
(stating that businesses such as Facebook, Microsoft, and Google have begun researching and imple-
menting biometric technology). 
 7 See Larduinat, supra note 6 (listing the increased use of biometrics such as fingerprint, facial, 
and voice recognition, iris scanning, and selfies as authentication measures for consumers); Press 
Release, The Future Is Here: iPhone X, APPLE: NEWSROOM (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.apple.
com/newsroom/2017/09/the-future-is-here-iphone-x/ [https://perma.cc/25CA-N6NZ] [hereinafter 
Apple Press Release] (detailing the method of Face ID to superimpose 30,000 infrared dots on an 
individual’s face to create and digitally store a template of the user’s face on the user’s device and not 
on a cloud-based server to ensure optimal security). 
 8 See Ted Claypoole & Cameron Stoll, Developing Laws Address Flourishing Commercial Use of 
Biometric Information, BUS. L. TODAY, May 2016, at 1, 4 (noting that the United States employs an 
industry-specific approach to privacy regulation, with several industry-specific laws that regulate 
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One of the largest collectors of individuals’ data is the modern day data 
broker industry.9 The modern day data broker industry exists to collect con-
sumer data, aggregate and analyze that information, and then sell it to third 
parties, often for marketing purposes.10 Data brokers collect and purchase con-
sumer data from publicly accessible sources such as social media and govern-
ment records, and from private sources such as commercial entities including 
other data brokers.11 After collecting consumer information, data brokers ag-
gregate that information into segments or marketable categories, often through 
automated predictive analysis tools.12 A study published by the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) found a number of these categories to be harmful to con-
sumers and potentially discriminatory.13 For example, the FTC uncovered cat-
egories targeting consumers’ race and income levels such as “Urban Scramble” 
and “Mobile Mixers” which targeted low income Latinos and African Ameri-
cans.14 Data brokers often assign marketing “scores” to these categories and 
sell that information to employers and businesses such as loan companies.15 
Discrimination can occur when individuals in low scoring categories are spe-
cifically targeted for exposure to advertisements for subprime credit and lower 
levels of service from those businesses or employers.16 To prevent potential 
                                                                                                                           
private and public collection and use of an individual’s biometric identification data within various 
sectors). 
 9 See FED. TRADE COMM’N (FTC), FTC DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 46–47 (2014) [hereinafter FTC DATA BROKERS], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-
may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/7W59-QGWQ] (stating that one data broker 
collected information on “1.4 billion consumer transactions and over 700 billion aggregated data ele-
ments” and another broker collected “3000 data segments for nearly every U.S. consumer”). 
 10 See id. at 3 (describing the business of the data broker industry); Data Brokers and “People 
Search” Sites, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE (Oct. 17, 2017), http://www.privacyrights.org/
content/data-brokers-and-your-privacy [https://perma.cc/JE7P-67HD] (defining the term data broker 
and differentiating between data brokers based upon the type of information sold to third parties). 
 11 See FTC DATA BROKERS, supra note 9, at 11–14 (listing the sources from which data brokers 
obtain consumer information). 
 12 See id. at 19–20 (describing the process data brokers use to categorize consumer data). 
 13 See id. at 20 (noting that the different categorizations created the potential for discrimination by 
differentiating between consumers based on a variety of factors such as race, age, educational level, 
net worth, and specific health conditions); see also Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 673–75 (noting 
that discrimination can occur through both intentional and inadvertent means within algorithms that 
use proxies that align with certain classes of people); Borgesius, supra note 4, at 2091–93 (noting that 
predictive algorithms can categorize individuals in a discriminatory manner). 
 14 See FTC DATA BROKERS, supra note 9, at 20, 47 (listing different marketable categories creat-
ed with consumers’ data, that ranged from seemingly harmless to overtly harmful). 
 15 See BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR DATA 
AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD 62 (2015) (describing how data brokers such as Acxiom sort individu-
als into categories that are then sold to businesses, employers, or other entities); FTC DATA BROKERS, 
supra note 9, at 31 (describing the system of attributing marketing scores to consumer data). 
 16 See FTC DATA BROKERS, supra note 9, at 48 (stating that consumers assigned a low marketing 
score are unable to correct any false data attributed to that score and therefore are limited to marketing 
targeted to that score range). 
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commercial misuse, states are beginning to implement statutes that regulate 
businesses’ collection, use, and disclosure or sale of biometric data.17 The state 
statutes, however, offer conflicting definitions and standards of regulation.18 
This Note examines the developing regulation of biometric data in com-
mercial industries.19 Part I of this Note discusses businesses’ increased use of 
biometric technology in security tools, the discrimination caused by the mod-
ern data broker industry, and regulation of biometric data in the current federal 
privacy landscape.20 Part II of this Note discusses the rise of state implementa-
tion of statutes that regulate businesses’ interaction with biometric data.21 Part 
III of this Note argues that as more states look to adopt biometric data laws, 
there must be some balance to the scope of regulation.22 Specifically, there 
must be consideration of both protecting individual consumers’ biometric data 
from discriminatory use and businesses’ interest in the use of biometric data to 
enhance security.23 Furthermore, this Note argues that either the states should 
implement biometric data statutes or Congress should implement comprehen-
sive federal regulation similar to that in Washington state, which imposes a 
“commercial purpose” limitation on the scope of regulation.24 
I. BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION IN A BIG DATA WORLD 
In the past decade, businesses have implemented cutting edge biometric 
identification technology into every facet of society, including financial ser-
vices, daycares, retailers, advertising, and social media.25 A primary applica-
                                                                                                                           
 17 See Sharon Roberg-Perez, The Future Is Now: Biometric Information and Data Privacy, 31 
ANTITRUST 60, 61–63 (2017) (listing the three states that have biometric data regulation statutes and 
the additional states that have been in talks, have pending legislation, or have introduced bills regard-
ing regulation of businesses’ collection and use of biometric data). 
 18 See generally Lara Tumeh, Washington’s New Biometric Privacy Statute and How It Compares 
to Illinois and Texas Law, BLOOMBERG L.: PRIVACY L. WATCH, Oct. 16, 2017, at 1, 1–3, https://
www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/washington-s-new-biometric-privacy-70894/ [https://perma.cc/GM4D-
EJL6] (listing the differences in notice, consent, sale, and enforcement requirements among the three 
state statutes). 
 19 See infra notes 25–251 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 25–131 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 132–203 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 204–251 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 204–251 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 246–251 and accompanying text. 
 25 See Claypoole & Stoll, supra note 8, at 1 (noting that it is common practice for banks to use 
voiceprint as a security measure in calls to customer service centers); Roberg-Perez, supra note 17, at 
60 (defining biometrics as measurements of a person’s physical being using either physiological or 
behavioral characteristics); Kathy Lohr, Fingerprint Scans Create Unease for Poor Parents, NPR: 
ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (Nov. 20, 2012), https://www.npr.org/2012/11/20/165225794/fingerprint-
scans-create-unease-for-poor-parents [https://perma.cc/2K3C-ZJA9] (detailing the use of fingerprint 
identification in Mississippi for parents receiving state subsidized child care to ensure authentication); 
Meyer, supra note 6 (stating that businesses such as Facebook and the retail industry have begun re-
searching and implementing biometric technology). 
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tion has been the collection and use of individuals’ biometric data in security 
and fraud prevention tools, enabling more accurate authentication of individu-
als.26 The United States, however, does not have a single, comprehensive fed-
eral law regulating businesses’ collection and use of biometric data.27 Without 
regulation, businesses are free to disclose an individual’s biometric data to 
third parties, such as data brokers.28 Data brokers can aggregate biometric data 
with both personally identifiable information (“PII”) and non-PII to categorize 
individuals, which could lead to commercial misuse in the form of opaque dis-
crimination, through use of biased models where consumers lack the ability to 
view and correct false or misleading information.29 
This Part describes the current landscape created by the convergence of 
businesses’ increased use of biometric technology with the unregulated data 
broker industry.30 Section A of this Part discusses the rise of biometric data 
technology and its increased use in businesses’ security and fraud prevention 
measures.31 Section B discusses the modern day data broker industry’s use of 
                                                                                                                           
 26 See Claypoole & Stoll, supra note 8, at 1 (describing the uses of biometric identification to 
authenticate consumers); Tim De Chant, The Boring and Exciting World of Biometrics, PBS NO-
VANEXT (June 18, 2013), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/next/tech/biometrics-and-the-future-of-
identification/ [https://perma.cc/4DRP-8H2C] (noting that a significant rise in biometric technology 
occurred after the United States government invested vast amounts of money into biometric research 
and development in response to 9/11). 
 27 See Claypoole & Stoll, supra note 8, at 4 (noting that federal privacy laws in the United States 
are tailored to specific industries). 
 28 See FTC DATA BROKERS, supra note 9, at 13–14 (reporting that consumers’ private infor-
mation is purchased by data brokers from commercial entities such as retailers and financial services 
companies); see also Data Brokers and “People Search” Sites, supra note 10 (stating that data bro-
kers’ collection and use of consumer data is narrowly regulated and does not allow consumers to see 
the data collected about them or to correct any inaccuracies). 
 29 See FTC DATA BROKERS, supra note 9, at 11–14, 20 (listing different types of marketable catego-
ries created through analysis and use of consumers’ data collected from both public and private sources); 
see also Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Person-
ally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1828–31 (2011) (noting that United States federal 
law does not provide a single, universal definition of personally identifiable information (“PII”) but ra-
ther defines PII in various ways such as any information that identifies a person, any nonpublic personal 
information, non-aggregate data, and specific types of data defined as PII by operation of statute). Infor-
mation such as an individual’s first and last name, address, telephone number, email address, and social 
security number are typically defined to be PII by statute, whereas non-PII is information that cannot be 
used on its own to identify a single person. Schwartz & Solove, supra note 29, at 1831–32, 1836–37; 
Michael Brennan, Can Computers Be Racist? Big Data, Inequality, and Discrimination, FORD FOUND.: 
EQUALS CHANGE BLOG (Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.fordfoundation.org/ideas/equals-change-
blog/posts/can-computers-be-racist-big-data-inequality-and-discrimination/ [https://perma.cc/9EEA-
FGZE] (stating that a major risk of using large data sets for predictive analysis is that its implementation 
is not free from biases). 
 30 See infra notes 34–131 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 34–58 and accompanying text. 
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“big data” and its effect on discrimination.32 Section C of this Part discusses 
the use of biometric data in the traditional federal privacy landscape.33 
A. Use of Biometric Identification Data to Enhance Security 
The year 2017 saw some of the largest, most advanced, and most publicly 
reported data breaches in history.34 The WannaCry attack affected over 300,000 
computers globally.35 The breach of Deep Root Analytics, a media firm working 
for the Republican National Committee, compromised data on 198 million 
American voters.36 Spotlighted by the media, the breach of Equifax, a prominent 
consumer credit reporting entity, exposed data on 143 million Americans.37 
Businesses faced with the continuous threat of cyberattacks are often ill-
equipped to adequately protect their consumers’ PII.38 Since 2005, over 8,000 
data breaches have been publicly reported, compromising an estimated 10 bil-
lion records.39 According to Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, in the year 2017 
                                                                                                                           
 32 See infra notes 59–97 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 98–131 and accompanying text. 
 34 See The World’s Biggest Data Breaches, GEMALTO (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.gemalto.
com/review/Pages/The-world’s-biggest-data-breaches.aspx [https://perma.cc/UE8S-BD2R] (reporting 
that in the first half of 2017 there were “918 reported data breaches worldwide and almost 1.9 billion 
compromised data records worldwide”). 
 35 See Bill Chappell, WannaCry Ransomware: What We Know Monday, NPR: THE TWO-WAY 
(May 15, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/05/15/528451534/wannacry-ransom
ware-what-we-know-monday,causing%20major%20disruptions%20worldwide [https://perma.cc/
5QAY-2N6C] (describing WannaCry as a ransomware attack that disabled infiltrated computers by 
demanding ransom payments in the cryptocurrency Bitcoin). 
 36 See Katie Reilly, Nearly 200 Million U.S. Voters’ Personal Data Accidentally Leaked by Data 
Firm Contracted by RNC, FORTUNE (June 20, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/06/19/deep-root-
analytics-voter-data-exposed/ [https://perma.cc/5KYG-SKRP] (noting that the exposed data included 
home addresses, dates of birth, phone numbers, and voters opinions on political issues). 
 37 See Seena Gressin, The Equifax Data Breach: What to Do, FTC: CONSUMER INFO. (Sept. 8, 
2017), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2017/09/equifax-data-breach-what-do [https://perma.cc/
6LA5-ZDEU] (stating that the breach exposed individuals’ names, home addresses, Social Security 
numbers, dates of birth, driver’s license numbers, and credit card numbers). 
 38 See PONEMON INST., 2017 STATE OF CYBERSECURITY IN SMALL & MEDIUM-SIZED BUSINESS-
ES 1 (2017), https://keepersecurity.com/assets/pdf/Keeper-2017-Ponemon-Report.pdf [https://perma.
cc/Q73U-USA9] (noting that more than 50% of small businesses surveyed have been the target of 
cyber data attacks arising from employee negligence and lack of resources to implement extensive 
data security programs). New forms of malware and ransomware are being developed and used faster 
than cybersecurity programs designed to combat these attacks can be implemented. See Danny Palm-
er, Ransomware Crooks Test a New Way to Spread Their Malware, ZDNET (Jan. 31, 2018), http://
www.zdnet.com/article/ransomware-crooks-test-a-new-way-to-spread-their-malware/ [https://perma.
cc/7AW9-4C9G] (describing a recent form of ransomware named GandCrab that locks a victim’s 
network until they pay to have it unlocked using the relatively unknown cryptocurrency Dash instead 
of the more widespread cryptocurrency Bitcoin). 
 39 Data Breaches, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE (Mar. 26, 2017), http://www.privacyrights.
org/data-breaches [https://perma.cc/7SL5-SK7Q]. 
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alone, 1.9 billion records were exposed.40 In response, governments and busi-
nesses have increasingly implemented biometric identification systems to en-
hance security.41 Technological advancements have made biometric identifica-
tion systems economically accessible for commercial use, enabling businesses 
to more easily adopt security, authentication, and fraud prevention measures 
for the protection of consumers.42 
Biometrics are defined as measurements of a person’s physical being 
based upon physiological or behavioral characteristics.43 The definition of bio-
metric data or biometric identifiers commonly includes retina or iris scans, fin-
gerprints, voiceprints, scans of hand or face geometry, or images derived from 
photographs.44 Biometric “authentication” is defined as an automated method 
that relies on “unique” factors to identify individuals.45 According to experts in 
biometrics, these unique identifiers should contain the following optimal traits: 
(1) immutable nature over time; (2) great variability within a set of people; (3) 
possession by the entire set of people and ability to be measured indefinitely 
over time; (4) ability to be measured electronically; and (5) consented to by 
individuals for collection.46 Using the above described traits as identification 
points, the following three-step process is generally applied to create biometric 
measurements: (1) a device takes an image; (2) that image is transformed into 
a biometric identifier using patterns such as pitch and tone for voice recogni-
tion, or a finger’s specific contours for fingerprint identification; and (3) the 
identifier is put into an algorithm that generates a digital template.47 The value 
                                                                                                                           
 40 See Data Breaches by Breach Type, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE (Mar. 26, 2017), https://
www.privacyrights.org/data-breaches/breach-type?taxonomy_vocabulary_11_tid=2434 [https://perma.
cc/N2Z4-78YP]. 
 41 See Larduinat, supra note 6 (describing the rise of biometric technology as an alternative meth-
od of verifying an individual’s identity). 
 42 See Claypoole & Stoll, supra note 8, at 1 (attributing increased and easier use of biometric 
identification systems to technology advances in “sensors, readers, and software”); Larduinat, supra 
note 6 (listing the increased use of biometrics such as fingerprint, facial, and voice recognition, iris 
scanning, and selfies as authentication measures for consumers). 
 43 See Roberg-Perez, supra note 17, at 60 (determining the characteristics that may be properly 
used in biometric identification). 
 44 See James L. Wayman et al., Introduction to BIOMETRIC SYSTEMS: TECHNOLOGY, DESIGN 
AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 1, 1 (James L. Wayman et al. eds., 2005) (defining biometric tech-
nologies); Roberg-Perez, supra note 17, at 60 (defining biometric authentication); see also Norberg v. 
Shutterfly, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1106 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (finding that the Illinois Biometric In-
formation Privacy Act’s definition of biometric identifiers includes scans of facial geometry and im-
ages derived from photographs); Claypoole & Stoll, supra note 8, at 1 (listing the common types of 
biometric authentication measures). 
 45 See Roberg-Perez, supra note 17, at 60. 
 46 See Wayman et al., supra note 44, at 3. 
 47 Christopher A. Miles & Jeffrey P. Cohn, Tracking Prisoners in Jail with Biometrics: An Exper-
iment in a Navy Brig, NAT’L INST. OF JUST. J., Jan. 2006, at 6 (stating that a template is a digital repre-
sentation of the individual’s unique biometric identifiers and can be stored in a database). 
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of biometric data lies in the data’s unique and unchangeable nature, which pro-
vides much greater security than easily-hacked passwords.48 
Biometric identification is being used across numerous sectors for data 
security, individual authentication, fraud prevention, and to provide consumers 
with a simpler security experience.49 These sectors range from the govern-
ment’s use of fingerprint biometrics in border control and correctional facili-
ties, to use in the private sector as a means to manage employees.50 The bank-
ing and financial industries have been at the forefront of implementing bio-
metric identification security tools.51 For example, in 2017, U.S. Bank part-
nered with Amazon’s Alexa devices to enable consumers to access and com-
plete banking transactions through voiceprint recognition.52 In 2016, Master-
Card announced a new initiative to test replacing passwords with selfies 
through facial recognition technology, in addition to developing other methods 
of authentication through voice recognition and cardiac rhythm.53 In the tech 
industry, the replacement of passwords with selfies or facial recognition tech-
nology has become a reality with the November 2017 release of Apple’s iPh-
                                                                                                                           
 48 See Claypoole & Stoll, supra note 8, at 1 (arguing that biometric data provides greater security 
when compared to traditional data security measures); Larduinat, supra note 6 (noting that biometric 
technology increases security for consumers). Contra Meyer, supra note 6 (suggesting that biometric 
data is not entirely secure because unlike changeable passwords and social security numbers, “[w]e’re 
stuck with our faces”). 
 49 See Roberg-Perez, supra note 17, at 60 (predicting that mobile devices containing fingerprint 
recognition technology will increase to one billion within 2017). Experimental methods are being 
developed to measure biometrics based upon an individual’s “ocular blood vessel pattern, ear shape, 
gait, heart rhythm, and online behavior.” Id. 
 50 See Claypoole & Stoll, supra note 8, at 1 (describing the FBI’s Next Generation Identification 
program that is being developed to collect a range of biometrics including “fingerprints, iris scans, 
DNA profiles, voiceprints, palm prints and photographs” and that may be used in conjunction with the 
Department of Homeland Security and Defense biometric databases); Miles & Cohn, supra note 47 
(stating that as early as 2000, the National Institute of Justice and Department of Defense considered 
using biometric identification for criminal justice purposes and implemented the Biometric Inmate 
Tracking System at a naval brig in Charleston); Matthew A. Karlyn & Christopher G. Ward, Using 
Biometric Timekeeping? Be Aware of Potential Compliance Risks, NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 23, 2017), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/using-biometric-timekeeping-be-aware-potential-compliance-
risks [https://perma.cc/9TT5-H3DM] (noting the increased use of biometric “timekeeping” in work-
places through fingerprint, hand, and iris scans to decrease fraudulent time worked data). 
 51 See Claypoole & Stoll, supra note 8, at 1 (explaining that banks often use voiceprint as an 
authentication measure in calls to customer service centers). 
 52 See Customers Can Now Complete Banking Tasks with U.S. Bank Skill for Amazon Alexa, U.S. 
BANK (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.usbank.com/newsroom/news/customers-can-now-complete-
banking-tasks-with-us-bank-skill-for-amazon-alexa.html [https://perma.cc/84LQ-YAVR]. Gareth 
Gaston, an Executive Vice-President at U.S. Bank stated that “[v]oice technology is going to be cen-
tral to the future of digital interaction.” Id. 
 53 See Replacing Passwords with Selfies, MASTERCARD, https://newsroom.mastercard.com/
videos/replacing-passwords-with-selfies/ [https://perma.cc/4DXA-TQHT] (describing the pilot pro-
gram to replace traditional passwords with other identification measures such as selfies or photo-
graphs taken by consumers). 
2018] Business and Consumer Interests in Biometric Data Regulation 357 
one X.54 The security feature relies on facial recognition in lieu of a password 
or fingerprint to unlock the device.55 Other companies are attempting to ad-
vance facial recognition authentication by requiring smiling or winking.56 This 
additional movement adds a level of security by ensuring that the object being 
scanned is a living individual and not merely a photograph or constructed 
mask.57 Although biometric identification technology has the potential to pro-
vide consumers with greater data security and privacy protection, its rapid im-
plementation coincides with what scholars call the “age of big data,” which 
may ultimately undermine any potential privacy benefits.58 
B. Modern Day Data Brokers and Discrimination 
The use of big data has become embedded in the operations of global so-
ciety.59 In general, the term “big data” is used to describe the sheer scale and 
interconnectedness of information collected and retained by individuals, gov-
ernments, and businesses that provides economic and social value.60 Given 
today’s information-sharing environment, the benefits and risks of big data are 
                                                                                                                           
 54 See Apple Press Release, supra note 7 (detailing the features of Apple’s iPhone X, including 
the ability to unlock and secure the device and make payments). 
 55 See id. (explaining that Face ID projects 30,000 infrared dots on an individual’s face to create 
and digitally store a template on the user’s device, as opposed to a cloud-based server, to ensure opti-
mal security). 
 56 See Claypoole & Stoll, supra note 8, at 1. 
 57 See id.; see also Apple Press Release, supra note 7 (stating that Face ID is specifically designed 
not to be fooled by inanimate objects). 
 58 See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Privacy in the Age of Big Data: A Time for Big Decisions, 
64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 63, 63 (2012), https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-paradox-
privacy-and-big-data/ [https://perma.cc/83L9-UFQS] (defining the current time period as the “age of 
big data”); see also Larduinat, supra note 6 (attributing the implementation of biometric technology 
into businesses’ services and products, in part to the increased level of security provided by biometric 
information). 
 59 See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 673 (stating that “big data is the buzzword of the dec-
ade”); Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress 
Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 96 (2014) (acknowledging the scope of big data across 
industries and stating that “big data” is an ambiguous term that generally describes the “use of large 
data sets in data science and predictive analysis”); see also JOHN PODESTA ET AL., EXEC. OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES, 1, 5 (2014), https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U2TN-FVQ6] (reporting that as big data operations increasingly occur in real time, 
they are likely to impact numerous aspects of an individual’s daily life). 
 60 See Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 58, at 63 (explaining that the vast number of individuals, 
governments, and businesses that have access to data contributes to the global economy through “in-
novation, productivity, efficiency, and growth”); see also Kenneth Olmstead & Aaron Smith, Ameri-
cans’ Experiences with Data Security, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 26, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/
2017/01/26/1-americans-experiences-with-data-security/ [https://perma.cc/YNE9-7A4Z] (stating that 
approximately 64% of Americans provided personal information to online services and nearly two-
thirds of Americans have been the subject of a data breach or theft). 
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amplified.61 For example, big data is used to improve educational institutions’ 
provision of services to students, healthcare institutions’ quality of treatment to 
patients, and has been used by companies such as Google to identify inequality 
in their hiring and employment structures.62 Nevertheless, there are numerous 
risks as well, such as the potential to enable opaque discrimination against en-
tire classes of people.63 For example, predictive crime policing programs such 
as PredPol correlate the data of historical patterns to target potential crime ge-
ography.64 A confirmation bias occurs, as police are sent to patrol areas with a 
history of arrests and criminal activity, often historically impoverished black 
and Hispanic neighborhoods, and inevitably find the crime they are looking 
for.65 Additionally, big data has been used by advertisers in invasive consumer 
ad targeting and by insurance agencies to predict whether a potential customer 
is too “erratic” based upon their activity and use of “likes” on Facebook.66 
In this dual landscape of beneficial and risky big data, the modern day da-
ta broker industry has immense potential to adversely impact consumers.67 A 
2017 study published by the FTC found that one broker collected data on “1.4 
billion consumer transactions and over 700 billion aggregated data elements” 
and another broker collected “3000 data segments for nearly every U.S. con-
                                                                                                                           
 61 See FTC, BIG DATA: A TOOL FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION? UNDERSTANDING THE ISSUES, 
1, 5, 8–9 (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/big-data-tool-inclusion-or-
exclusion-understanding-issues/160106big-data-rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9WJ-B2DM] (claiming 
that the expansion of big data use across industries has led to both beneficial and harmful retention 
and usage). 
 62 See id. at 6–8. 
 63 See id. at 8–9 (noting the risks of big data, including opaque discrimination through use of 
biased models where consumers are prevented from seeing the discriminatory algorithms and correct-
ing false or misleading information); Borgesius, supra note 4 (analogizing data brokers’ collection 
and use of consumer data to the surveillance industry’s practice of “social sorting” because both create 
potentially detrimental categorizations of individual data). 
 64 See CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALI-
TY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 85 (2016). 
 65 See id. at 86–87 (noting that when police are sent into historically crime-filled neighborhoods, 
relatively minor crimes such as nuisances are increasingly reported, producing more data and there-
fore more policing). 
 66 See SCHNEIER, supra note 15, at 62–63 (stating that the Internet works primarily due to indi-
viduals voluntarily giving up data that is then sold to advertisers for personalized targeting); Kevin 
Peachey, Facebook Blocks Admiral’s Car Insurance Discount Plan, BBC (Nov. 2, 2016), http://
www.bbc.com/news/business-37847647 [https://perma.cc/T44X-ZZ5J] (reporting that Facebook re-
jected Admiral Insurance’s proposal to use prospective customers’ Facebook activity to determine 
levels of risk and assign insurance rates based on criteria such as the user’s likes and the content of 
their posts). 
 67 See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 677 (suggesting that the use of big data has the ability to 
segregate individuals within historically protected classes through automated processes); Nathan 
Newman, Comment Letter on Big Data: A Tool for Inclusion or Exclusion, Project No. P145406, at 
3–4 (Aug. 15, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2014/08/00015-
92370.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YCR-5EHA] (describing “price discrimination” where companies offer 
different online prices for the same goods or services based upon the data collected about individuals). 
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sumer.”68 Data brokers collect consumer information, aggregate consumer data 
into segments or marketable categories, and then sell those categories to third 
parties.69 
The process begins when data brokers collect and purchase individuals’ 
information from both public and private sources.70 Public sources include 
federal, state, and local governments as well as social media sites, blogs, and 
the internet.71 Data brokers purchase consumers’ private information from 
commercial entities such as retailers and financial services companies.72 Data 
brokers also obtain consumer data from other data brokers, often making it 
difficult for the consumer to determine how their information was originally 
obtained.73 As data brokers circumvent direct consumer contact, consumers 
often do not even know that data brokers collect, retain, and use their infor-
mation.74 Furthermore, as of 2018, there is little legal authority preventing data 
brokers and commercial entities from sharing, buying, or selling consumer da-
ta, affording consumers little recourse to object to these practices.75 
Data brokers aggregate the collected data elements with other PII through 
predictive algorithms that generate categories of individuals for third parties to 
                                                                                                                           
 68 FTC DATA BROKERS, supra note 9, at 3 (reporting findings on nine data brokers’ collection 
and storage of data on individual U.S. consumers and consumer transactions). Consumer transaction 
information that is obtained from commercial sources often includes information about purchases 
including the type of asset obtained, the price, the dates of transaction, and the means of providing 
payment. Id. at 13. Data elements include distinct data points about an individual such as his or her 
name, age, race, gender, marital status, and “derived data elements” such as an individual’s interests. 
Id. at 19. Data segments or categories are created through the input of specific data elements into a 
predictive algorithm to place consumers into marketable categories. Id. 
 69 See id. at 13–14, 19, 23. 
 70 See id. at 11–14 (listing the sources from which data brokers obtain consumer information and 
recognizing that out of the nine data brokers reviewed in the report, none obtained data directly from 
consumers). 
 71 See id. at 13–14. Federal government sources of consumer data include the U.S. Census Bu-
reaus, the Social Security Administration, the U.S. Postal Service, and other federal agencies that 
collect information on individuals. Id. at 11. State and local government sources of consumer data 
include professional and recreational licenses, property and assessor records such as taxes, deeds, and 
mortgages, voter registration, court documents including criminal records and civil actions. Id. 12. 
Other sources of publicly available information include directories and information obtained on the 
Internet through sites such as LinkedIn, where profiles are not restricted in the user’s privacy settings. 
See id. at 13, 13 n.40 (explaining that some social media sites such as Facebook restrict data brokers 
use of automated tools to collect data). 
 72 See id. at 13–14. 
 73 See id. at 46 (stating that out of the nine data brokers in the study, seven exchanged data with 
other data brokers). 
 74 See FTC DATA BROKERS, supra note 9, at 46 (noting that data brokers do not collect consumer 
information directly from the consumer). 
 75 See Data Brokers and “People Search” Sites, supra note 10 (stating that data brokers’ collec-
tion and use of consumer data is narrowly regulated and does not allow consumers to see the data 
collected about them or to correct any inaccuracies). 
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purchase.76 These categories may ultimately be inherently discriminatory, lead-
ing to exploitation of consumers.77 For example, the FTC uncovered categories 
targeting consumers’ race and income levels such as “Urban Scramble” and 
“Mobile Mixers” in which the underlying data contained a large percentage of 
low income Latinos and African Americans.78 Other categories included “Ru-
ral Everlasting,” which targeted individuals older than sixty-six who had low 
levels of education and owned almost no valuable assets, and “Diabetes Inter-
est” and “Cholesterol Focus,” which targeted individuals based on sensitive 
health information.79 
As the last step in their operation, data brokers ultimately sell these cate-
gories to third parties such as employers, advertisers, and discount loan com-
panies.80 A specific danger arises from data brokers’ and other entities’ use of 
predictive algorithms.81 Predictive algorithms do not merely categorize indi-
viduals based on known data but also create inferences about individuals.82 
Target Corporation (“Target”), for example, used predictive algorithms to de-
termine which of its female consumers were pregnant.83 The female consumers 
                                                                                                                           
 76 See SCHNEIER, supra note 15, at 62 (detailing how data brokers such as Acxiom sort individu-
als into categories that are then sold to businesses, employers, or other entities); FTC DATA BROKERS, 
supra note 9, at 19–20, 46–47 (describing the process of creating “data segments” from “data ele-
ments” and listing categorizations derived from sensitive consumer information such as age, ethnicity, 
income levels, and health issues). 
 77 See SCHNEIER, supra note 15, at 62 (listing examples of categories created by data brokers to 
sell to third parties); see also Goodman, supra note 5 (noting that biometric technology has the ability 
to collect an individual’s sensitive information such as race, gender, age, economic class or health 
conditions that could be used to categorize that individual in a discriminatory manner). 
 78 See FTC DATA BROKERS, supra note 9, at 20, 47 (listing marketable categories specifically 
created based upon consumers’ race and financial data). 
 79 See id. (noting that the categorizations created the potential for discrimination by differentiat-
ing between consumers based on factors such as race, age, educational level, net worth, and specific 
health conditions). 
 80 See SCHNEIER, supra note 15, at 62 (describing the types of third parties that purchase data 
categories created by data brokers); FTC DATA BROKERS, supra note 9, at 25 (explaining that third 
parties purchase selected categories from data brokers with the choice of including or excluding cer-
tain data segments or categories of consumers such as “Financially Challenged” or “Underbanked”). 
 81 See Crawford & Schultz, supra note 59, at 96 (stating that the sheer scale of information col-
lected by big data inevitably includes individuals’ sensitive information that can be discriminatorily 
used); Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 680 (2017) (noting that 
the risk posed by automated algorithms is the inability to presently know the future discriminatory 
effects of the rules learned by the machines). 
 82 See FTC DATA BROKERS, supra note 9, at 19 (describing that data brokers make assumptions 
about individuals based upon actual data to create “derived data elements”); Crawford & Schultz, 
supra note 59, at 98 (noting that big data algorithms can intake known public information about indi-
viduals to create a form of artificial PII). 
 83 See Crawford & Schultz, supra note 59, at 94, 98 (detailing how Target Corporation’s market-
ing department predicted which of its female customers were pregnant through aggregation of con-
sumer data and use of predictive models). Notably, Target Corporation (“Target”) wanted to advertise 
its pregnancy and baby products to females before the information was available through public birth 
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did not specifically disclose this information, yet Target aggregated patterns of 
purchase behavior to assign females a “pregnancy prediction score.”84 Target 
then gave this information to its marketing department to send pamphlets and 
coupons for pregnancy and baby-related products to female customers’ homes 
based upon that score.85 Predictive models like the one created by Target are 
often automated to recognize correlations and categorize individuals based on 
forecasts of future outcomes and estimations of unknown variables, such as 
using the frequency and types of products a customer purchases to estimate the 
stage of her pregnancy.86 Potential discrimination can result from implement-
ing algorithms that fail to prevent or correct implicit biases, introduce institu-
tional prejudices, define the target variable in a manner that affects classes dif-
ferently, or fail to introduce a sufficient range of factors.87 
Predictive models can function as discriminatory feedback loops because 
they are scalable, opaque, and able to cause damage.88 These models are able 
to cause harm because there is no current comprehensive federal law that gives 
consumers a right to correct inaccurate or false data, or assumptions made by 
                                                                                                                           
records. See Charles Duhigg, Psst, You in Aisle 5, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 19, 2012, at 30 (reporting 
that Target created these predictive models to attract female consumers before their competitors). 
 84 See Duhigg, supra note 83 (stating that Target identified twenty-five products, including un-
scented lotion, vitamin supplements, and cotton balls, that, upon aggregated purchase over time, ena-
bled Target to not only predict that a female was pregnant, but also her individual due date with near 
accuracy); see also Crawford & Schultz, supra note 59, at 98 (explaining that the current privacy laws 
do not reach Target’s use of predictive data because it was created or inferred rather than directly 
obtained). Although retailers’ use of predictive models is not currently regulated, consumers often 
lose trust in the marketplace when ads are seen as too personal or invasive, which therefore acts as a 
check on retailers’ aggressive advertising practices. See FTC DATA BROKERS, supra note 9, at 48 
(noting that an entity’s targeted marketing based upon personal information can cause consumers to 
refrain from continued interaction with those entities). 
 85 See Crawford & Schultz, supra note 59, at 95 (stating that although consumers are aware that 
retailers such as Target collect data about them, it is unlikely that they expect the use of predictive 
models to infer sensitive and private information); Duhigg, supra note 83 (detailing Target’s targeted 
marketing of products to female consumers based upon Target’s model’s trimester prediction for each 
consumer). 
 86 See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 677 (stating that to improve automated decision making, 
predictive algorithms are exposed to a set of observed characteristics to determine correlations or 
relationships within the data); Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 58, at 64 (providing the example of 
Kaiser Permanente using big data analytics to determine that the medication Vioxx had caused 27,000 
deaths between 1999 and 2003). 
 87 See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 675 (noting that the potential for discrimination can 
arise intentionally or inadvertently because algorithms are designed to use proxies for historically 
discriminated classes); Latanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery, COMM. ACM, May 
2013, at 44, http://mags.acm.org/communications/may_2013?pg=47#pg47 [https://perma.cc/T3XR-
WFST] (reporting that upon a Google search of a name “racially associated” with the black communi-
ty, there was a significant increase in resulting advertising insinuating the individual had a criminal 
record). 
 88 See O’NEIL, supra note 64, at 27, 31 (describing predictive algorithms that are opaque, scala-
ble, and able to cause damage as “weapons of math destruction”). 
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data brokers.89 These models are opaque because consumers often do not have 
access to their data to confirm that it is incorrect or misleading.90 Furthermore, 
even if data brokers allow consumers to see the data collected about them, the 
reports usually only include the individual data points but not the aggregated 
categorizations.91 Lastly, these models are scalable because they have the abil-
ity to be applied consistently across diverse and sizeable data sets.92 
Importantly, the methodology used in big data collection often allows da-
ta brokers and businesses to circumvent the already scant regulations surround-
ing the collection, use, and disclosure of PII.93 When data brokers or business-
es use opaque predictive algorithms, proof of discriminatory intent or impact is 
difficult to ascertain.94 At the point of data collection, it is often the case that 
no PII has actually been obtained.95 Models can use an individual’s activity on 
Facebook, their recent geographic locations, or even the genre of music on a 
consumer’s streaming service to infer and create attributes that are then used as 
proxies for race, gender, or socioeconomic status, all of which are arguably 
forms of PII.96 As noted above, these models are not always accurate, and in-
                                                                                                                           
 89 See FTC DATA BROKERS, supra note 9, at 48 (describing how consumers assigned a low mar-
keting score are unable to correct any false data attributed to that score and therefore are limited to 
disparate marketing targeted to that score range); Data Brokers and “People Search” Sites, supra note 
10 (stating that data brokers’ collection and use of consumer data is narrowly regulated and does not 
allow consumers to see the data collected about them or to correct any inaccuracies). 
 90 See FTC DATA BROKERS, supra note 9, at 49 (explaining that for products such as insurance, 
data brokers do not allow consumers to have access to the data collected about them and specific data 
that is accessible to consumers, is often difficult, if not impossible for consumers find). 
 91 See O’NEIL, supra note 64, at 152 (providing that data brokers lack complete transparency with 
consumers by not disclosing the conclusions and categorizations made about consumers, but rather 
limit disclosure to the individually collected facts). 
 92 See id. at 27, 31 (explaining that to be “scalable,” a model must have the ability to be applied 
consistently across diverse and sizeable data sets). Credit rating models are an example of scalable 
models because after a score has been applied to an individual, that score can impact numerous other 
aspects of an individual’s life. See id. at 30. 
 93 See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 694, 701, 711 (stating that antidiscrimination law as it 
currently exists does not provide much recourse to claims of discrimination based upon data mining); 
Crawford & Schultz, supra note 59, at 101 (describing big data’s ability to use data to discriminate in 
the credit loan and housing industries, escaping federal credit regulations and fair housing laws). 
 94 See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 692–93 (stating that big data correlations and algorithms 
are formed from obscure proxies). 
 95 See FTC DATA BROKERS, supra note 9, at 19 (describing how data brokers can make assump-
tions about individuals based off non-PII data to create “derived data elements”); Barocas & Selbst, 
supra note 4, at 692 (detailing how data mining is able to predict or make assumptions about individ-
uals’ undisclosed information using predictive analysis); Crawford & Schultz, supra note 59, at 100 
(noting that the predictive models can essentially create an individual’s PII, even though none of the 
data points alone constitute PII). 
 96 See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 712 (listing types of consumer data used as proxies in 
predictive models); Crawford & Schultz, supra note 59, at 100–01 (describing the types of data that 
are used as proxies to develop consumer categories). 
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dividuals are rarely provided with the means to correct any false characteriza-
tions, enabling both intentional and inadvertent discrimination.97 
C. Biometric Data in the Federal Privacy Landscape 
The right to privacy has not been recognized as an absolute fundamental 
human right of United States citizens.98 There is no specific protection for 
rights of privacy within the U.S. Constitution.99 Only in 1965, in Griswold v. 
Connecticut, did the Supreme Court find a “penumbra” of privacy rights with-
in the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.100 Despite this rationale, 
some scholars have claimed that the right to privacy should cede to considera-
tions of capitalism such as protection of the press, free market theory, or pro-
motion of public welfare.101 Although federal law in the United States is not 
entirely without data privacy regulation, regulations at the federal level are 
industry-specific and inconsistent across sectors.102 Under many of these in-
                                                                                                                           
 97 See FTC DATA BROKERS, supra note 9, at 48 (detailing that consumers assigned a low market-
ing “score” are unable to correct any false data attributed to that score and are therefore limited to 
marketing targeted to that score range); Data Brokers and “People Search” Sites, supra note 10 (not-
ing that no federal law enables consumers to see the data collected about them or to correct any inac-
curacies). 
 98 See McKay Cunningham, Privacy in the Age of the Hacker: Balancing Global Privacy and 
Data Security Law, 44 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 644, 663 (2012) (stating that the United States does 
not provide its citizens with a comprehensive right to privacy). In contrast, in May 2018, Europe im-
plemented the General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”), a comprehensive data protection law 
that is directly binding on all EU member states. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL H. SCHWARTZ, PRI-
VACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 264 (7th ed. 2017) (noting the direct application of the GDPR with a few 
exceptions for EU member states to implement further legislation). 
 99 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483–85 (1965) (holding that although there is no 
enumerated right to privacy in the Constitution, in certain cases, the courts have found rights in “pe-
numbras” where they are not explicitly stated in the Constitution because their “existence is necessary 
in making the express guarantees fully meaningful”). 
 100 See id. at 484 (determining that “penumbra” rights of “privacy and repose” exist in the First, 
Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution). A penumbra, as used by the Court in Gris-
wold, is a place from which a right is implied or inferred from specific guarantees in the Constitution. 
See id. at 484. 
 101 See Richard Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 404, 422 (1978) (describing 
Judge Posner’s economic theory of privacy that protection of individual privacy inhibits the free flow 
of information and thereby market efficiency); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to 
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 214, 216–18 (1890) (detailing the circumstances in which the right to 
privacy must cede to public welfare, freedom of the press, and freedom of capital markets). 
 102 See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 98, at 34–35 (listing a number of United States federal 
privacy laws that are specific to sectors such as healthcare, credit reporting, education, and financial 
industries); Theodore Rostow, What Happens When an Acquaintance Buys Your Data?: A New Pri-
vacy Harm in the Age of Data Brokers, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 667, 676 (2017) (calling commercial 
privacy regulations in U.S. federal law a “patchwork”); see also Cunningham, supra note 98, at 664 
(detailing the sectoral approach of the United States regarding privacy regulations as opposed to a 
comprehensive approach). The “sectoral” approach signifies industry-specific privacy legislation 
whereas the “comprehensive” approach indicates privacy legislation that is applicable across indus-
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dustry-specific regulations, the duties imposed upon businesses and definitions 
of key terms such as “PII” are fragmented and varied.103 There is, however, a 
level of consistency in the types of activities subjected to regulation, such as an 
entity’s collection, use, disclosure, and retention of PII.104 For example, the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 addresses financial institutions’ collection and 
use of nonpublic personal information, the Family Educational Rights and Priva-
cy Act addresses educational institutions’ collection and use of student records, 
and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) ad-
dresses covered entities’ collection and use of protected health information.105 
Thus, the United States does not currently have a single, comprehensive 
federal law regulating businesses’ collection and use of biometric data.106 Ra-
ther, in line with the United States’ sectoral approach, there are several indus-
try-specific laws that govern private and public collection and use of an indi-
vidual’s biometric identification data within financial, educational, commer-
cial, and healthcare institutions.107 HIPAA’s definition of “individually identi-
fiable health information” can include certain biometric data.108 The Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act protects individual’s genetic information 
from discrimination in insurance and employment contexts.109 The Privacy Act 
of 1974 provides potential barriers to entities from accessing or disclosing an 
                                                                                                                           
tries. See Cunningham, supra note 98, at 664 (describing that the United States takes a sectoral ap-
proach and the EU takes a comprehensive approach). 
 103 See Cunningham, supra note 98, at 665 (stating that the definition of PII differs under the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act, Video Privacy Protection Act, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act); Rostow, 
supra note 102, at 677–78 (providing examples of sectoral differences such as the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act’s inapplicability to “non-covered entity” data such as that produced 
by Apple devices, Google searches, or wearable devices and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act’s applica-
tion to data used only by “financial institutions”). 
 104 See Rostow, supra note 102, at 677 (noting that of the federal privacy statutes that do provide 
regulation, they only protect the means by which an entity interacts with the data). 
 105 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2012) (addressing disclosure of non-
public personal information); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (2012) 
(addressing the limitations on disclosure of protected education records); Health Information Portabil-
ity and Accountability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2012) (listing the limitations of disclosure of indi-
vidually identifiable health information). 
 106 See Claypoole & Stoll, supra note 8, at 4 (noting that several industry-specific federal laws 
regulate biometric identification data). 
 107 See id.; see also Roberg-Perez, supra note 17, at 63 (listing the different sector-specific federal 
laws that address biometric data). 
 108 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d(6) (defining the term “individually identifiable health information” to 
include data obtained from an individual by a qualified entity that concerns health conditions or health 
care of an individual that either identifies the individual or can reasonably be believed to identify the 
individual). 
 109 See 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012) (stating that accessibility of health insurance may not be predi-
cated based on an individual’s genetic information). Genetic information is defined under the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act as information about an individual’s and their family members’ 
genetic tests. See Genetic Information Discrimination, EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://
www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/genetic.cfm [https://perma.cc/HN6D-9MDR]. 
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individual’s personally identifying data that is contained in federal records.110 
Of note, the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”) provides 
extensive protection of minors’ privacy, including the collection of children’s 
biometric data.111 COPPA requires parental consent before photos, videos, or 
audio recordings that contain a child’s image or voice are collected.112 Addi-
tionally, COPPA allows businesses to verify parental consent using facial 
recognition technology.113 
The FTC has the authority to promulgate and enforce rules to protect con-
sumers from “unfair and deceptive” business practices.114 Aside from en-
forcement of COPPA, however, the FTC has yet to create specific rules regard-
ing businesses’ implementation and use of biometric data in technology.115 Ra-
ther, the FTC has issued best practices including, “privacy by design,” increas-
ing transparency, giving consumers a method to opt-in or opt-out of biometric 
information collection, and obtaining clear and concise consent from individu-
als.116 In accordance with these best practices, businesses often subject the data 
they maintain to anonymization or de-identification techniques.117 Anonymiza-
                                                                                                                           
 110 See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2012) (regulating the collection, maintenance, 
use, and disclosure of PII and records of individuals that are maintained by federal agencies). 
 111 See Child Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2012) (listing 
photos, videos, or audio files containing a child’s image or voice as personal information under the 
statute). 
 112 See 15 U.S.C. § 6501(9) (stating that acceptable consent from a child’s parent must be ob-
tained using any reasonable effort, including through use of new technology); Children’s Online Pri-
vacy Protection Rule: A Six-Step Compliance Plan for Your Business, FTC (June 2017), https://
www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/childrens-online-privacy-protection-rule-six-step-
compliance [https://perma.cc/349J-GUG7] (detailing the requirements an entity subject to the Child 
Online Privacy Protection Act must follow including notice and consent). 
 113 See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, supra note 112 (stating that authorized meth-
ods of verifying parental consent include having a parent submit two photos, a driver’s license or 
photo ID and a second photo, and authenticating the photos with facial recognition technology). 
 114 See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012) (listing the scope of the 
FTC’s authority to protect consumers). 
 115 See FTC, FACING FACTS: BEST PRACTICES FOR COMMON USES OF FACIAL RECOGNITION 
TECHNOLOGIES 1–2 (2012) [hereinafter FACING FACTS], https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/reports/facing-facts-best-practices-common-uses-facial-recognition-technologies/121022
facialtechrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5QL-RNV5] (recommending best practices businesses should 
implement if planning to or already using biometric facial recognition technology); see also Claypoole 
& Stoll, supra note 8, at 3 (describing the FTC’s publication “Facing Facts” that provides guidance 
for businesses overseen by the FTC). 
 116 See FACING FACTS, supra note 115, at 1–2 (describing the recommended best practices for 
businesses’ collection and use of biometric facial recognition technology). 
 117 See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anony-
mization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1703, 1707–08 (2010) (noting that entities that maintain databases often 
use anonymization techniques to provide greater security for individuals’ information). Anonymiza-
tion or de-identification can occur through a number of techniques, the most common being the de-
termination and elimination of any information that identifies an individual, followed by either sup-
pression, generalization, or aggregation. See id. at 1713–15 (listing the methods of anonymization 
used to de-identify an individual before that data is released to a third party). Suppression is the dele-
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tion has been championed as ensuring an individual’s privacy, and is distinct 
from mere de-identification, which is defined as a method to remove personal 
information without the explicit guarantee of irreversibility.118 Some scholars, 
however, criticize these theories’ promises of data security, as computer scien-
tists have conducted studies to prove that both anonymized and de-identified 
data can be easily re-identified.119 
Furthermore, in 1998 the FTC put forth a version of Fair Information 
Practice Principles (“FIPPs”) as a framework for developing privacy laws in an 
age of rapid technological development.120 The five core principles set forth 
include: (1) notice/awareness; (2) choice/consent; (3) access/participation; (4) 
integrity/security; and (5) enforcement/redress.121 Of particular note, whereas 
the FTC’s best practices and FIPPs provide non-binding structures to regulate 
an entity’s collection, use, and disclosure of an individual’s PII through notice 
and consent requirements, they do not provide a mechanism to protect con-
sumers against the “creation” of PII through predictive algorithms.122 
Notably, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), not the FTC, 
currently has jurisdiction over regulation of Internet service providers 
(“ISPs”).123 The Trump Administration recently signed a Congressional Re-
                                                                                                                           
tion of the identifying information, generalization changes the identifying information, and aggrega-
tion is the combination of groups of similar data sets. See id. (explaining that each method is forced to 
reconcile increased privacy protections with diminishing utility of the data as it is anonymized). 
 118 See Ira S. Rubinstein & Woodrow Hartzog, Anonymization and Risk, 91 WASH. L. REV. 704, 
710–11 (2016) (delineating between anonymization and de-identification). 
 119 See Ohm, supra note 117, at 1724–25 (stating that theories of anonymization have been dis-
proven through development of re-identification techniques including the combination of anonymized 
data with outside information); Simson L. Garfinkel, De-Identification of Personal Information, 
NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH 1–3 (2015), http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2015/NIST.
IR.8053.pdf (noting the issues with the definitions and usage of anonymization and de-identification). 
 120 See FTC, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 7–11 (1998) [hereinafter PRIVACY 
ONLINE], https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-report-congress/
priv-23a.pdf [https://perma.cc/SB5Z-L7NY] (listing the Fair Information Practice Principles (“FIPPs”) 
the FTC encourages legislatures to consider when constructing new privacy regulations). 
 121 See id. at 7–11. 
 122 See FACING FACTS, supra note 115, 1–2 (recommending best practices such as notice and 
consent and opt-in and opt-out mechanisms for businesses implementing facial recognition technolo-
gy); PRIVACY ONLINE, supra note 120, at 7–11 (listing the five core FIPPs principles); see also Craw-
ford & Schultz, supra note 59, at 106 (noting the difficulty in regulation at the initial collection of a 
single data element because often nothing collected is considered PII and it is not possible to deter-
mine at that point any potential predictive privacy harms). 
 123 See In re Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, Report and Order on Remand, 30 FCC 
Rcd. 5601, paras. 398–403 (2015) (authorizing the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) 
regulation of broadband companies). The FCC’s Open Internet Order determined that broadband 
companies are “common carriers,” which are specifically exempted from the FTC’s jurisdiction under 
the FTC Act. See Brian Naylor, Congress Overturns Internet Privacy Regulation, NPR (Mar. 28, 
2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/03/28/521831393/congress-overturns-internet-privacy-regulation 
[https://perma.cc/YV26-BKT7] (noting that the nullification of the FCC’s Broadband Privacy Rule 
provides a path for the FTC as the sole regulator of internet privacy issues); Arielle Roth, Three Issues 
to Watch as the FCC Writes Privacy Rules for Broadband Companies, HUDSON INST. (Aug. 15, 
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view Act that nullified the Broadband Privacy Rule, an FCC rule that had yet 
to take effect but would have regulated ISPs’ collection and sale of consumer 
data.124 Following the nullification of this rule, ISPs can continue to record and 
sell individuals’ browsing data, are not required to inform consumers what in-
formation they collect or who they sell it to, and can force individuals to re-
solve complaints by arbitration.125 Importantly, ISPs are currently not prohibit-
ed from selling an individual’s data, including biometric data, to third parties 
such as data brokers.126 
The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”), ef-
fective as of May 25, 2018, applies extraterritorially to U.S. businesses that 
offer goods or services to, or monitor the behavior of EU individuals.127 The 
GDPR defines biometric data as “personal data resulting from specific tech-
nical processing relating to the physical, physiological or behavioral character-
istics of a natural person which allow or confirm the unique identification of 
that natural person.”128 Under the statute, biometric data is listed as a type of 
sensitive personal data.129 The processing of sensitive personal data is entirely 
prohibited, subject to a number of enumerated exceptions including, but not lim-
ited to, obtaining explicit consent, specified public interest considerations, and 
certain exemptions in the fields of employment and social protection law.130 At 
                                                                                                                           
2016), https://www.hudson.org/research/12769-three-issues-to-watch-as-the-fcc-writes-privacy-rules-
for-broadband-companies [https://perma.cc/YP3F-CPW4] (describing the FCC’s Open Internet Order 
granting the FCC authority to regulate broadband companies). 
 124 See S.J. Res. 34, 115th Cong. (2017) (stating the Senate and House of Representatives joint 
resolution to nullify the FCC’s Broadband Privacy Rule). 
 125 See Devin Coldewey, Everything You Need to Know About Congress’ Decision to Expose 
Your Data to Internet Providers, TECH CRUNCH (Mar. 29, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/03/
29/everything-you-need-to-know-about-congress-decision-to-expose-your-data-to-internet-providers/ 
[https://perma.cc/9PPA-CVCL] (listing ISP conduct that is not subject to regulation). 
 126 See Alina Selyukh, FCC Chairman Goes After His Predecessor’s Internet Privacy Rules, NPR: 
THE TWO-WAY (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/02/24/517050966/fcc-
chairman-goes-after-his-predecessors-internet-privacy-rules [https://perma.cc/T7H8-SRLH] (explaining 
that without regulation, Internet service providers (“ISPs”) would not be prohibited from using or 
selling an individual’s data). Proponents of the FCC’s Broadband Privacy Act claim that ISPs can 
obtain more data on consumers than individual websites or non-broadband companies. See id. (noting 
that ISPs can obtain consumer data from each individual website or internet-based service that a con-
sumer accesses). 
 127 See Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/679, art.3, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 32–33 [hereinafter 
General Data Protection Regulation] (expanding the territorial scope of regulation of data controllers 
and processors that process “personal data” of individuals who are located in the EU). 
 128 See id. art. 4(14), at 34. 
 129 See id. art. 9, at 38–39 (listing the categories of data that are prohibited from processing sub-
ject to a list of enumerated exceptions). 
 130 See id. art. 9(2)–(4), at 38–39 (listing the situations in which a data controller or processor is 
not prohibited from processing an individual’s sensitive personal data). Personal data under the GDPR 
is defined as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person.” Id. art. 4(1), at 
33. Consent under the GDPR requires “freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication” 
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the time of publication of this Note the GDPR only recently took effect, and its 
total potential impact on U.S. businesses has yet to be ascertained.131 
II. MODERN PIONEERS: STATE BIOMETRIC DATA STATUTES 
Regulations addressing businesses’ use of biometric data are being devel-
oped at the cross-section of society’s need for greater data security and big da-
ta’s discriminatory impact on consumers.132 Over-regulation risks disincentiv-
izing technological development and use of biometric data to enhance securi-
ty.133 Under-regulation risks exposing entire categories of people to discrimi-
natory practices.134 As noted above, the industry-specific approach of federal 
privacy law does not provide a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of 
biometric data.135 As a result, states have increasingly sought to regulate busi-
nesses’ collection, use, retention, and disclosure of biometric data.136 Three 
states’ statutes, Illinois, Texas, and Washington, do provide comprehensive 
biometric data regulation, however, the statutes lack consistency.137 In addi-
                                                                                                                           
of the individual’s agreement to the processing of his or her personal data made by a “statement or by 
a clear affirmative action.” Id. art. 4(11), at 34. 
 131 See Yaki Faitelson, Yes, The GDPR Will Affect Your U.S.-Based Business, FORBES (Dec. 4, 
2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2017/12/04/yes-the-gdpr-will-affect-your-u-s-
based-business/#4eb2d5146ff2 [https://perma.cc/F9PT-9ZBC] (noting that the GDPR will affect dif-
ferent United States based businesses differently depending on the application of the territorial reach 
of the GDPR). 
 132 See Claypoole & Stoll, supra note 8 (regarding both the vast benefits and risks surrounding 
biometric technology as the reason for increased regulation surrounding its use by private and public 
entities). 
 133 See Daisy Contreras, Illinois Issues: The Battle Over Transparency and Privacy in the Digital 
Age, NPR ILL. (July 13, 2017), http://nprillinois.org/post/illinois-issues-battle-over-transparency-and-
privacy-digital-age#stream/0 (reporting that business advocates critique Illinois privacy statutes as 
imposing a technological development “chilling effect”). According to Carl Szabo of NetChoice, 
some already developed facial recognition technology cannot be used in Illinois. See id. (noting the 
comprehensive scope of Illinois’s BIPA); Meyer, supra note 6 (quoting Szabo of NetChoice that “re-
quiring consent before every use of the technology would create universal complexities that would 
eliminate many of the benefits of facial recognition”). 
 134 See O’NEIL, supra note 64, at 27, 31, 153 (noting the danger caused by opaque and scalable 
predictive algorithms for which there is no information accountability); Barocas & Selbst, supra note 
4, at 675 (explaining that potential discrimination can occur in both intentional and inadvertent ways 
through designing algorithms that use proxies for historically discriminated classes). 
 135 See Claypoole & Stoll, supra note 8, at 4 (describing that aligned with the United States’ in-
dustry-specific approach to privacy regulation, there are several industry-specific laws that govern 
private and public collection and use of an individual’s biometric identification data within financial, 
educational, and healthcare institutions). 
 136 See Roberg-Perez, supra note 17, at 62–63 (listing the additional states that have been in talks, 
have pending legislation or have introduced bills proposing regulation of collection and use of bio-
metric data). 
 137 See Tumeh, supra note 18 (listing the differences in notice, consent, sale, and enforcement 
requirements among the three state statutes). California recently passed a comprehensive privacy act, 
the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, set to take effect on January 1, 2020. See California 
Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, A.B. 375, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (describing the 
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tion, Alaska, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Hamp-
shire, and New York have looked to adopt their own versions of biometric data 
regulations.138 Despite the growing interest in regulation, some states have not 
been successful in passing any biometric regulation statutes, as both Montana’s 
and Connecticut’s proposed bills did not survive the state legislative process.139 
As states’ interest in regulation of businesses’ interaction with biometric 
data increases, it is important to understand the existing legal framework sur-
rounding state biometric data regulation.140 Section A of this Part discusses the 
2008 Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”), the recent surge of 
class action lawsuits brought under the BIPA, and the 2009 Texas Capture or 
                                                                                                                           
purpose of the act and providing the text of the act). The law includes biometric information in the 
definition of personal information and provides consumers with a number of rights including: (i) the 
right to require disclosure of their personal information a business collects, including what it is used 
for, and whether it is disclosed or sold and to whom; (ii) the right to opt-out of a business selling per-
sonal information to third parties; (iii) the right to be forgotten—or to have a business delete personal 
information upon request; and (iv) the right to receive equal services and pricing. See id. §§ 1798.100, 
1798.105, 1789.110, 1798.115, 1798.120, 1798.125, 1798.135, 1798.140(b), 1798.140(o)(1)(E) (de-
scribing consumers’ rights under the act and the inclusion of biometric information in the definition of 
personal information). At the time this Note was written, the California statute had not yet passed, and 
thus exceeds the scope of this analysis. 
 138 See Establishing a Committee to Study the Use and Regulation of Biometric Information, 
Sess. Laws, Ch. 21, H.B. 523 (N.H. 2018) (passing the biometric regulation bill to establish a commit-
tee); A9793, Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018) (proposing a biometric data law identical to the Illinois 
BIPA); S8547, Senate, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018) (proposing a biometric data law identical to the Illinois 
BIPA); H.B. 72, 30th Leg., 1st Sess. (Ala. 2017) (proposing notice and consent requirements for the 
collection of biometric information as well as an expansive definition of biometric data); H.B. 5522, 
Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2017) (stating the purpose of regulating retailer’s use of facial recog-
nition software for marketing purposes); H.B. 1985, 190th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2017) 
(providing that § 1 of Ch. 93H of Massachusetts’s General Laws would be amended to include “bio-
metric indicator” within the definition of “personal information”); H.B. 5019, 99th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Mich. 2017) (proposing a biometric privacy act that contains notice, consent, retention, sale and dis-
closure requirements); H.B. 518, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2017) (proposing regulation of a pri-
vate entity’s collection, use, storage, and disclosure of an individual’s biometric data); H.B. 523, 
165th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2017) (amending the proposed biometric regulation bill to instead 
establish a committee to “study the use and regulation” of biometric information). Section 2 of Ch. 
93H of the Massachusetts General Laws requires the adoption of regulations regarding any person that 
“owns or licenses personal information” of a resident of Massachusetts. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
93H, § 2(a) (2018) (detailing the mandated regulations regarding the personal information of Massa-
chusetts residents). 
 139 See Bill Actions, MONT. LEGISLATURE, http://laws.leg.mt.gov/legprd/law0210W$BSIV.
ActionQuery?P_BILL_DFT_NO5=LC2063&Z_ACTION=Find&P_Sess=20171 [https://perma.cc/
CK3B-B6KQ] (noting that the bill died in the Standing Committee on April 28, 2017); Bill Status, 
CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, https://www.cga.ct.gov/asp/cgabillstatus/cgabillstatus.asp?selBillType=
Bill&bill_num=HB05522&which_year=2017 [https://perma.cc/326B-SZ3Y] (noting that the bill was 
referred to the Joint Committee on General Law in January 2017 and never passed). 
 140 See infra notes 143–203 and accompanying text. 
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Use of Biometric Identifier Act (“CUBI”).141 Section B of this Part discusses 
the Washington statute enacted in 2017.142 
A. Biometric Data Statutes in Illinois and Texas 
Despite the fact that Illinois and Texas implemented comprehensive statutes 
regulating businesses’ collection and use of biometric information in 2008 and 
2009 respectively, both statutes remained largely latent until the surge of class 
action suits brought under the Illinois BIPA beginning in 2015.143 Part 1 of this 
Section discusses the fundamental provisions of the Illinois BIPA.144 Part 2 of 
this Section discusses the rise of class actions brought under the BIPA in Illinois 
and the obstacles facing plaintiffs.145 Part 3 of this Section discusses the similari-
ties and differences between the Illinois BIPA and the Texas CUBI.146 
1. The Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act 
In 2008, Illinois became the first state to enact a comprehensive law ad-
dressing businesses’ collection and use of biometric information.147 The statute 
broadly defines “biometric information” as “any information” that is “based on 
an individual’s biometric identifier used to identify an individual,” without re-
gard for the method by which it is obtained, used, or disclosed.148 The Illinois 
BIPA defines “biometric identifiers” as a “retina or iris scan, fingerprint, voice-
print, or scan of hand or face geometry.”149 The BIPA specifically excludes from 
the definition of “biometric identifier,” photographs, demographic data, and 
physical characteristics such as “height, weight, hair color, or eye color.”150 
                                                                                                                           
 141 See infra notes 143–188 and accompanying text. 
 142 See infra notes 189–203 and accompanying text. 
 143 See Claypoole & Stoll, supra note 8, at 2 (noting Illinois BIPA’s relative anonymity until five 
class actions brought by Illinois residents in 2015 claimed violations of the Illinois BIPA). 
 144 See infra notes 147–159 and accompanying text. 
 145 See infra notes 160–180 and accompanying text. 
 146 See infra notes 181–188 and accompanying text. 
 147 See Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 14/1–14/99 (2009); Roberg-
Perez, supra note 17, at 61 (noting that Illinois was the first state to pass comprehensive biometric 
data regulations in 2008). 
 148 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/10 (providing the definition of biometric information). Notably the 
Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”)’s definition of biometric information excludes infor-
mation “derived” from the types of identifiers that are excluded from the definition of biometric iden-
tifiers. See id. 
 149 See id. 
 150 See id. (listing the types of identifiers excluded from the definition of “biometric identifier” 
within the statute). Notably, biometric information collected from an individual that is subject to regu-
lation under the Genetic Information Privacy Act or the Health Insurance Portability and Accountabil-
ity Act is not included in the Illinois statute’s definition of “biometric identifier.” See id. 
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The BIPA contains five foundational requirements in regulating business-
es’ collection and use of biometric data.151 First, businesses must, in writing, 
notify consumers and obtain informed written consent for collection of bio-
metric data.152 Furthermore, the notice must state the fact that biometric data is 
being collected or stored, and must also state the specific purpose and length of 
time for which the data is being collected, stored, and used.153 Second, busi-
nesses are prohibited from selling or “otherwise profiting” from biometric da-
ta.154 Third, the statute allows a limited right to disclosure in certain enumerat-
ed circumstances.155 Fourth, retention of the data is permitted only until the 
initial purpose for collection of the information has been satisfied, or within 
three years of the data subject’s last interaction with the business.156 Fifth, the 
statute creates a private right for an individual to bring a cause of action to en-
force violations of the Illinois BIPA.157 Notably, Illinois is the only state with a 
biometric data regulation statute that provides individuals with such a private 
right of action.158 Individuals may sue to recover the greater of actual damages 
or the statutory damages of $1,000 for each negligent violation of the statute 
and $5,000 for each intentional or reckless violation.159 
2. The Rise of Class Actions Under the BIPA 
Only in 2015 did the Illinois BIPA gain national recognition after five 
class action lawsuits were filed against Facebook and Shutterfly that claimed 
improper collection and use of Illinois residents’ biometric data.160 Four of 
these suits specifically claimed that Facebook’s tagging suggestion feature vio-
lated the Illinois BIPA by collecting and retaining individuals’ facial features 
                                                                                                                           
 151 See Claypoole & Stoll, supra note 8, at 2. 
 152 See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/15(b). 
 153 See id. § 14/15(a). 
 154 See id. § 14/15(c). The law does not directly specify the definition necessary for “otherwise 
profiting” for a violation of the statute. See id. 
 155 See id. § 14/15(d) (listing the circumstances in which an entity may disclose collected bio-
metric information including the individual’s consent, completion of a financial transaction, require-
ment under a state or federal ordinance, or due to a warrant or court subpoena). 
 156 See id. § 14/15(a) (detailing the measures required for retention and destruction of collected 
biometric information). 
 157 See id. § 14/20. 
 158 See id. (providing individuals with a private right to commence action under the Illinois BI-
PA); Capture or Use of Biometric Identifier Act, TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(b) (West 
2017) (stating that to enforce a violation of the statute, the Texas attorney general may bring an ac-
tion); H.B. 1493, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 4(2) (Wash. 2017) (stating that the Washington statute may 
only be enforced by the attorney general). 
 159 See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/20 (listing an individual’s right to bring a private cause of 
action and the potential recovery available). In addition to damages, an individual may collect reason-
able attorney’s fees and costs. See id. 
 160 See Claypoole & Stoll, supra note 8, at 2 (noting Illinois BIPA’s relative anonymity until five 
class actions brought by Illinois residents in 2015 claimed violations of the Illinois BIPA). 
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without their consent.161 In Norberg v. Shutterfly, the plaintiff alleged that 
Shutterfly violated the BIPA by creating, collecting, and storing “face tem-
plates” of individuals captured from photographs submitted to Shutterfly.162 
Shutterfly challenged the class action on the basis that the Illinois BIPA ex-
cluded photographs from its definition of biometric identifiers.163 The United 
States District Court of the Northern District of Illinois rejected Shutterfly’s 
motion, reasoning that the Illinois BIPA’s definition could reasonably include 
scans of facial geometry and images derived from photographs.164 
Following the 2015 class action suits brought against Facebook and Shut-
terfly, the years 2016 and 2017 saw a massive increase in class actions regard-
ing the Illinois BIPA.165 Shifting from the consumer context to the employment 
                                                                                                                           
 161 See Complaint at 1, 8, Gullen v. Facebook Inc., No. 15-CV-07681 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 2015) 
(claiming a violation of the BIPA because the plaintiff never consented to Facebook’s tagging feature 
that scans photographs for biometric information, collects that data, and suggests individuals to “tag” 
or designate as persons in the photograph); Complaint at 1–2, 11, Patel v. Facebook Inc., 290 F. Supp. 
3d 950 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (No. 15-CV-04265) (alleging Facebook violated § 15(b) of the BIPA for fail-
ing to comply with the statute’s notice and consent requirements); Complaint at 7, 10–11, Pezen v. 
Facebook Inc., No. 15-CV-03484 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 2015) (claiming a violation of the BIPA because 
Facebook failed to obtain notice and consent as required by the statute); Complaint at 15–16, Licata v. 
Facebook Inc., No. 15-CH-05427 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 2015) (claiming violations of the BIPA due to 
Facebook’s noncompliance with the statute’s notice and consent requirements); see also Claypoole & 
Stoll, supra note 8, at 3 (noting that the plaintiffs in each class action claimed they were not Facebook 
users at the time Facebook captured and stored their biometric information). 
 162 See Norberg v. Shutterfly, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1106 (N.D. Ill. June 2015) (noting that 
the plaintiffs were not consumers of Shutterfly). 
 163 See id. at 1105–06 (stating that the defendants brought a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and 
claimed that biometrics derived from photographs are outside the scope of Illinois BIPA’s definition 
of biometric identifiers). 
 164 See id. at 1106 (denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss because the plaintiff stated a viable 
claim for relief under the Illinois BIPA in consideration of the Illinois BIPA’s definition of biometric 
identifiers); see also In re Facebook Biometric Info. Privacy Litig., 185 F. Supp. 3d 1158, 1171–72 
(N.D. Ill. 2016) (denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss because images derived from photographs 
could reasonably fall within the scope of the Illinois BIPA’s definition of biometric identifiers). 
 165 See Carley Daye Andrews et al., K&L GATES LLP, Litigation Under Illinois Biometric Infor-
mation Privacy Act Highlights Biometric Data Risks (Nov. 7, 2017), http://www.klgates.com/
litigation-under-illinois-biometric-information-privacy-act-highlights-biometric-data-risks-11-07-
2017/ [https://perma.cc/U8DY-J84S] (describing the increasing trend of class actions brought under 
the Illinois BIPA); Daniel B. Pasternak, Illinois Employers Face a Recent Rash of Class Action Law-
suits Filed Under State Biometric Information Privacy Law, NAT’L L. REV. (Nov. 27, 2017), https://
www.natlawreview.com/article/illinois-employers-face-recent-rash-class-action-lawsuits-filed-under-
state [https://perma.cc/87E9-G8X2] (stating that at least thirty suits claiming violations of the BIPA 
have been brought in Illinois since August 2017). In response to the rising number of class actions, the 
Illinois House and Senate have put forward bills to amend the scope of the BIPA. See S.B. 3053, 
100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2018) (proposing amendments to the BIPA); H.B. 5103, 100th 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2018) (proposing amendments to the BIPA). One proposal exempts the 
application of the BIPA to private entities if the collected biometric information is used exclusively 
for employment, human resources, fraud prevention, or security purposes. Ill. S.B. 3053 (proposing 
amendments to limit the scope of application of the BIPA to private entities); Ill. H.B. 5103 (propos-
ing amendments to limit the scope of application of the BIPA to private entities). The Senate bill fur-
ther excludes from the definition of biometric identifiers, physical or digital photographs and data 
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context, the more recent class actions nearly all center on employers’ use of 
biometric technology to track employee work hours and activities.166 The 
claims range from alleging that employers did not inform their employees 
about the businesses’ policies for the use, retention, and destruction of collect-
ed fingerprint data to claiming that the employers failed to obtain employees’ 
written consent before collecting, using, or storing the biometric information.167 
In one particular class action suit, Howe v. Speedway LLC, the plaintiffs 
claimed that the employer, Speedway LLC, improperly disclosed the employ-
ees’ biometric fingerprint data to an “out-of-state-vendor,” the supplier of the 
fingerprint time-tracking machines.168 
Despite the rise in number of class action lawsuits, plaintiffs continue to 
face a number of obstacles in bringing a suit under the BIPA including issues 
of standing and the constitutionality of the statute.169 Defendants in these class 
actions have relied on the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Spokeo v. 
Robins to claim that the plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged an injury for the 
                                                                                                                           
generated from physical or digital photographs. Ill. S.B. 3053 (proposing exclusions to the definition 
of biometric identifier). As of Fall 2018, the bills are still in committee. See Bill Status of SB3053, ILL. 
GEN. ASSEMBLY http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?GA=100&DocTypeID=SB&Doc
Num=3053&GAID=14&SessionID=91&LegID=110583 [https://perma.cc/47YG-TU5J] (noting that 
the bill is re-referred to Assignments); Bill Status of HB5103, ILL. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.ilga.gov/
legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=5103&GAID=14&DocTypeID=HB&LegId=110644&Session
ID=91&GA=100 [https://perma.cc/YR3K-W6Z8] (noting that the bill is re-referred to the Rules 
Committee). 
 166 See Complaint at 2–3, Fields v. ABRA Auto Body & Glass LP, No. 2017-CH-12271 (Ill. Cir. 
Ct. Sept. 8, 2017) [hereinafter Fields Complaint] (detailing a class action by employees of ABRA 
Auto Body & Glass claiming that the company violated the Illinois BIPA by failing to provide notice 
and obtain written consent required under the statute to collect and store employee fingerprints to 
monitor checking in and out of work); Complaint at 6–8, Knobloch v. Chi. Fit Ventures LLC, No. 
2017-CH-12266 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Sept. 8, 2017) [hereinafter Knobloch Complaint] (detailing a class action 
suit brought by members of a chain of exercise facilities, Crunch Fitness, claiming that the gym vio-
lated the Illinois BIPA both by collecting members’ fingerprint data without proper notice and con-
sent, and illegally retaining that data); Andrews, supra note 161(listing the different targets of the 
BIPA class action suits, including retailers, online service providers, to employers); see also Adam 
Janofsky, Fingerprint-Scanning Time Clocks Spark Privacy Lawsuits, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 11, 
2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/biometric-time-clocks-spark-a-wave-of-privacy-lawsuits-1515
364278 [https://perma.cc/SUT6-5UBE] (noting recent suits against fifty companies claiming violation 
of the Illinois BIPA due to use of biometric technology that scans fingerprints). 
 167 See Fields Complaint, supra note 166, at 2–3 (claiming violations of the BIPA for lack of 
notice and written consent); Knobloch Complaint, supra note 166, at 6–8, (claiming violations of the 
BIPA for lack of notice, proper consent, and postage of a data retention schedule). 
 168 See Complaint at 1–3, 8–9, Howe v. Speedway LLC, No. 2017-CH-11992 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Sept. 1, 
2017) [hereinafter Howe Complaint] (detailing a class action by employees of Speedway claiming that 
the company’s collection and storage of employee fingerprints to authenticate employees violated the 
Illinois BIPA by failing to adhere to the statute’s notice, consent, and data retention requirements and 
by allegedly disclosing the data to a third party). 
 169 See Pasternak, supra note 165 (describing the issues within the BIPA that are being litigated in 
2017 and likely to have an effect on subsequent cases). 
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court to grant Article III standing.170 Under Spokeo, the Court held that “alle-
gations of bare procedural violations of a federal statute,” without evidence of 
harm, do not satisfy the concrete injury requirement of Article III.171 In a re-
cent notable case, Santana v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, on grounds of lack of 
Article III standing, the dismissal by the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York of a claim that the defendant, Take-Two Inc., 
violated the Illinois BIPA.172 Take-Two Inc., a videogame maker, created a 
basketball video game platform that enabled users to create personalized virtu-
al avatars by using the game console’s camera to scan the player’s face and 
head.173 In addition to claiming that the defendant did not comply with the BI-
PA’s written data retention requirements, the plaintiffs claimed that the defend-
ant failed to maintain adequate data security by transferring “unencrypted 
scans of face geometry” on the Internet rather than on a secure network and by 
failing to subject the stored face scans to de-identification methods such as 
anonymization.174 The Second Circuit held the plaintiffs’ claim failed to state a 
“risk of real harm” that the plaintiffs’ biometric information would be “im-
properly accessed by third parties.”175 A further distinction arose in the Illinois 
Appellate Court case, Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp., where the 
court found that plaintiffs are only “aggrieved” as required under the statute if 
they state an actual injury or harm, and not just a mere “technical violation.”176 
                                                                                                                           
 170 See Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547–50 (2016) (listing the pleading requirements a 
plaintiff must meet to be granted Article III standing); see also Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 559 (1992) (holding that Article III limits the authority of federal courts to decide “cases and 
controversies”). Under Lujan, sufficient standing requires three elements: (1) a concrete injury; (2) the 
injury is fairly traceable to actions of the defendant; and (3) it must be likely, and not speculative, that 
the injury is redressable by a favorable holding. See 504 U.S. at 560–61. 
 171 See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (explaining that a “risk of real harm” may be sufficient to satis-
fy the element of concrete injury but a “bare procedural violation” absent a concrete harm is not suffi-
cient). 
 172 See Santana v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 717 F. App’x 13, 16–17 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(stating that the plaintiffs’ claim failed to sufficiently state a concrete injury and therefore lacked Arti-
cle III standing). 
 173 See id. at 13–14 (describing the 3-D scanning mechanism that allows players of Take-Two’s 
game to create individualized avatars for use in the game only after the user first agrees to the End 
User License Agreement). 
 174 See id. at 14, 16 (listing the claims against the defendant including the violation of Illinois 
BIPA’s requirement that businesses use the “reasonable standard of care within [the] industry” to 
ensure the security of the biometric data collected and used by the business); see also 740 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. § 14/15(e) (2018) (listing the data security requirements for businesses that collect and use 
biometric information). 
 175 See Santana, 717 F. App’x at 16–17 (refusing to find that an actual data breach need occur for 
there to be a “risk of real harm” to confer a sufficient injury to grant Article III standing); see also 
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (stating the standard to find a “risk of real harm” for Article III standing). 
 176 See Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., No. 2-17-0317, 2017 WL 6523910, at *4–5 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2d Dist. Dec. 21, 2017); see also Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (providing that an injury suffi-
cient for Article III standing may include a “risk of real harm”). 
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The discrepancy between the harm required for a plaintiff to meet Article III 
standing versus the statutory “aggrieved” person standard has yet to be re-
solved.177 
Notably, some courts have granted Article III standing based upon an inter-
pretation that the purpose of the BIPA is to prevent personal invasions of privacy 
as opposed to merely improper disclosure or misuse of biometric data.178 The 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in Monroy v. 
Shutterfly, Inc., denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss by finding that the BI-
PA did not require claims of actual harm and therefore, plaintiffs had Article III 
standing.179 Whereas in Monroy the biometric data obtained by the defendant 
was collected from a third party without the consent of the plaintiff, in Santana 
and Rosenbach, the plaintiffs voluntarily gave their data to the defendants.180 
3. The Texas CUBI vs. The Illinois BIPA 
Following the implementation of the Illinois BIPA, Texas enacted a state 
biometric law, the CUBI, in § 503.001 of the Texas Business and Commercial 
Code in the year 2009.181 The statute provides that “biometric identifiers” in-
clude a “retina or iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or record of hand or face 
geometry.”182 Similar to the Illinois BIPA, the Texas CUBI contains several 
foundational requirements.183 The Texas CUBI requires businesses to provide 
                                                                                                                           
 177 See Santana, 717 F. App’x at 16–17 (stating that the plaintiffs’ claim failed to sufficiently 
state a concrete injury and therefore lacked Article III standing); Howe v. Speedway LLC, No. 17-cv-
07303, 2018 WL 2445541, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2018) (noting the distinction between Article III 
and statutory standing but only addressing whether the plaintiff suffered an injury in fact for Article 
III standing); Rosenbach, 2017 WL 6523910, at *4–5 (finding that a party is not “aggrieved” under 
the terms of the BIPA statute if the party only claims a procedural violation without any injury or 
harmful consequence); see also Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 98 N.E. 3d 36 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d 
Dist. May. 2018) (allowing a petition for leave to appeal). 
 178 See Monroy v. Shutterfly, Inc., No. 16-C-10984, 2017 WL 4099846, at *1, *8–9 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 15, 2017) (stating that the question of whether the plaintiff suffered actual damages is not deter-
minative where the plaintiff claims an invasion of privacy). 
 179 See id. at *1, *8–9 (claiming that the defendant allegedly violated the BIPA after collecting 
and storing biometric data of the plaintiff, without his consent, from a photograph uploaded by a third 
party). 
 180 See Santana, 717 F. App’x at 13–14 (describing the 3-D scanning mechanism that allows 
players of Take-Two’s game to create individualized avatars for use in the game only after the user 
first agrees to the End User License Agreement); Monroy, 2017 WL 4099846, at *1 (claiming that a 
Shutterfly user uploaded a photograph of the plaintiff onto the defendant’s site without the plaintiff’s 
knowledge or consent); Rosenbach, 2017 WL 6523910, at *2 (describing the fingerprint-scanning 
mechanism employed by the defendant in order to authenticate season-pass holders). 
 181 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001 (2017); see Tumeh, supra note 18 (noting that Illi-
nois was the first to adopt a biometric regulation statute in 2008, followed by Texas). 
 182 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(a). 
 183 See Claypoole & Stoll, supra note 8, at 3 (listing fundamental provisions contained in the 
Texas statute). See generally 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/1–14/99; TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. 
§ 503.001. 
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notice and obtain informed consent before collection or use of an individual’s 
biometric data.184 Unlike in Illinois, however, no further specific notice and 
consent requirements are mandated in Texas.185 The Texas CUBI prohibits 
businesses from selling, leasing, or disclosing biometric data, with some ex-
ceptions such as with consent of the data subject, when disclosure is required 
under another law, or when disclosure is required pursuant to a warrant.186 The 
statute additionally imposes retention limitations where destruction is required, 
“within a reasonable time,” but no later than one year after the initial collection 
of the data.187 Notably, unlike the Illinois BIPA, the Texas CUBI does not af-
ford individuals a private right to action, but rather enforcement of the statute 
can only be brought through the state attorney general.188 
B. Washington’s Biometric Data Statute 
In 2017, Washington became the third state to enact a biometric data pro-
tection statute.189 The Washington statute defines a “biometric identifier” as 
“data generated by automatic measurements of an individual’s biological char-
acteristics, such as fingerprint, voiceprint, eye retinas, iris, or other unique bio-
logical patterns or characteristics that is used to identify a specific individu-
al.”190 In contrast to the Illinois and Texas statutes, Washington’s definition of 
“biometric identifier” does not include a record of “hand or face geometry” 
and excludes physical or digital photographs.191 The Washington definition is 
                                                                                                                           
 184 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(b) (listing the notice and consent requirements for 
collection and use of an individual’s biometric information). 
 185 Compare 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/15(a) (stating to specifically satisfy the notice require-
ment an entity must state the fact that biometric data is being collected or stored and the specific pur-
pose and length of time the data is being collected, stored, and used), with TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE 
ANN. § 503.001(b). 
 186 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(c)(1). 
 187 Id. § 503.001(c)(2–3), (c-1). 
 188 Compare 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/20 (providing that an individual whose rights have been 
violated under the BIPA has a private right of action to enforce those claims in court), with TEX. BUS. 
& COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(d) (stating that to enforce a violation of the statute, the Attorney Gen-
eral may bring an action with civil penalties not to exceed more than $25,000 for each violation). As 
the Texas statute does not contain a private cause of action, there have not been any class actions like 
those brought in Illinois. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(d). 
 189 See generally H.B. 1493, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017) (noting that the statute was en-
acted in 2017). 
 190 Id. § 3(1). 
 191 See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/10 (2008) (listing the types of identifiers, including scans of 
hand or face geometry, in the definition of “biometric identifier” under the BIPA); TEX. BUS. & COM. 
CODE ANN. § 503.001(a) (listing the types of data, including records of hand or face geometry, that 
are included within the definition of “biometric identifier” under the Texas statute); H.B. 1493, 65th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017) § 3(1) (excluding physical or digital photographs from the definition of 
biometric identifier). See generally Tumeh, supra note 18, at 1 (noting the differences between the 
Illinois, Texas, and Washington definitions of biometric identifiers). In Illinois, the inclusion of scans 
of “hand or face geometry” and the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois’s decision 
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instead limited to biometric information that has been “enrolled.”192 A business 
“enrolls” biometric information if it captures an individual’s biometric identifi-
er, converts it into a “reference template that cannot be reconstructed into the 
original output image,” and stores that template in a database that “matches the 
biometric identifier to a specific individual.”193 
Furthermore, Washington’s statute attempts to preserve businesses’ use of 
biometric data by regulating only the collection, retention, use, and disclosure 
of biometric identifiers for a “commercial” purpose.194 A commercial purpose 
is defined as “a purpose in furtherance of the sale, lease, or distribution of bi-
ometric data to third parties for the purpose of marketing goods and services 
which are unrelated to the initial transaction in which a person first gains pos-
session of an individual’s biometric identifier.”195 Notably, these requirements 
expressly exclude businesses’ collection of biometric data for “security or law 
enforcement” purposes, as defined as “preventing shoplifting, fraud, or any 
other misappropriation or theft of a thing of value.”196 The Illinois BIPA does 
not limit the scope of regulation to a commercial purpose and further directly 
states the need for biometric regulation due to increased use of biometrics in 
“security screenings.”197 Although the Texas biometric law does include a 
commercial purpose limitation, unlike Washington, commercial purpose is left 
                                                                                                                           
to include data generated from photographs in the BIPA’s definition of biometric identifiers gave rise 
to most of the recent class actions brought under the Illinois BIPA. See In re Facebook, 185 F. Supp. 
3d at 1171 (denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss, as images derived from photographs could 
reasonably fall within the scope of Illinois BIPA’s definition of biometric identifiers); Norberg, 152 F. 
Supp. 3d at 1106 (denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss because the plaintiff stated a viable 
claim for relief under the Illinois BIPA in consideration of the Illinois BIPA’s definition of biometric 
identifiers). 
 192 See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020(1)–(2) (2018) (stating the notice, consent, and opt-out 
requirements a “person” must abide by before enrolling an individual’s biometric identifier in a “data-
base for a commercial purpose”). 
 193 Wash. H.B. 1493 § 3(5) (defining the term “enroll” as it is used in the statute). 
 194 See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020(1), (6)–(7) (limiting regulation to biometric identifiers 
that are “enrolled” for a “commercial” purpose, creating an exception to regulation of biometric data 
collected for a “security” purpose). Contra 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/15(b) (listing the broad re-
quirements for an entity’s collection, receipt, capture, or purchase of biometric information for any 
purpose). 
 195 Wash. H.B. 1493 § 3(4) (listing the definition of “commercial purpose” within the statute). 
 196 Id. § 3(8) (defining “security or law enforcement” purposes within the statute). 
 197 Compare 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 14/5(a), 14/15(b)–(c) (noting the increased use of biomet-
rics in “security screenings” and noting that a business must comply with the BIPA regulations re-
garding collection and use of biometric data for all purposes), with WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 19.375.020(1), (6)–(7) (limiting regulation to biometric identifiers that are “enrolled” for a “com-
mercial” purpose, creating an exception to the regulation for biometric data collected for a “security” 
purpose). 
378 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:349 
undefined and the question of whether it includes security purposes has yet to 
be addressed.198 
The Washington statute imposes varying notice and consent requirements 
in “context-dependent” circumstances.199 Businesses that seek to share or sell 
individuals’ biometric data for commercial purposes must first provide notice, 
and either obtain consent or provide a mechanism for individuals to opt out of 
the subsequent use of the data for commercial purposes.200 The statute imposes 
data retention limitations for a time period “no longer than is reasonably nec-
essary” to comply with the law or a court order, protect against crime, fraud, or 
liability, and to provide individuals with the service for which the biometric 
data was initially obtained.201 Similar to Texas, and unlike Illinois, Washington 
does not afford individuals a private right to action.202 Rather, enforcement of 
Washington’s statute can only be brought by the state attorney general as a vio-
lation of Washington’s Unfair Business Practices-Consumer Protection Act.203 
III. SEEKING BALANCE: PREVENTING BIG DATA DISCRIMINATION  
AND PRESERVING BUSINESSES’ USE OF BIOMETRIC  
TECHNOLOGY TO ENHANCE SECURITY 
A business’s collection and use of biometric data presents both risks and 
benefits in the context of today’s unregulated data broker landscape.204 A pri-
mary danger is the potential for individuals’ biometric data to be subject to 
commercial misuse.205 One form of commercial misuse is the aggregation of 
biometric data with other PII or non-PII to opaquely discriminate against con-
                                                                                                                           
 198 See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(b)–(c) (regulating an entity’s capture and posses-
sion of biometric data for commercial purposes but leaving the term undefined in the statute); Tumeh, 
supra note 18 (noting the lack of clarity surrounding the Texas statute’s use of “commercial purpose”). 
 199 WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020(2) (noting that sufficient notice and consent is “context-
dependent” and that notice is adequate if by a “procedure reasonably designed to be readily available 
to affected individuals”). 
 200 Id. § 19.375.020(3), (5). 
 201 Id. § 19.375.020(4). 
 202 Compare TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(d) (stating that in order to enforce a viola-
tion of the statute, the attorney general may bring an action), and Wash. H.B. 1493 § 4(2) (stating that 
the Washington statute may only be enforced by the attorney general), with 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
§ 14/20 (providing individuals with a private right of action). 
 203 See Wash. H.B. 1493 § 4(2) (stating that the Washington statute may only be enforced by the 
attorney general under chapter 19.86 of the consumer protection act). 
 204 See FTC DATA BROKERS, supra note 9, at 13–14, 47 (reporting that consumers’ data is pur-
chased by data brokers from commercial entities such as retailers and financial services companies 
and used to create both beneficial and harmful marketable categories). 
 205 See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 677 (affirming data mining’s potential to segregate 
individuals within historically protected classes through automated processes); FTC DATA BROKERS, 
supra note 9, at 20, 47 (describing the marketable categories created and sold by data brokers that 
have immense potential to cause harm to consumers). 
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sumers.206 Here, as is common for the data broker industry, consumers are left 
without recourse to alter, control, or protest their harmful data profiles or cate-
gorizations.207 Despite these potential risks, over-regulation of biometric data 
may disincentivize technological development and businesses’ use of biometric 
data to enhance security.208 Although federal law in the United States is not 
entirely without data privacy regulation, regulations at the federal level are 
industry-specific and inconsistent across sectors.209 As biometric technology 
has an increasingly daily impact upon individuals across the United States, and 
as more states have stepped up to adopt biometric data laws, there must be 
some balance and consistency to the scope of regulation.210 Section A of this 
Part critiques the Illinois BIPA as overly broad and unduly burdensome on 
businesses.211 Section B of this Part argues that as states look to implement 
statutes that regulate businesses’ interaction with biometric data, they should 
look to model Washington’s biometric statute because it provides a better bal-
ance of protecting both consumer and business interests.212 Furthermore, as 
technology increasingly enables the dissemination of data across the United 
States, Congress should implement a comprehensive federal statute that regu-
lates businesses’ collection, use, and disclosure of biometric data.213 
                                                                                                                           
 206 See Goodman, supra note 5 (noting that biometric technology has the ability to collect an 
individual’s sensitive information such as race, gender, age, economic class or health conditions); 
FTC DATA BROKERS, supra note 9, at 20, 47 (explaining that the different categorizations created 
potential discrimination by differentiating between consumers based on a variety of factors from race, 
age, educational level, net worth, to specific health conditions). 
 207 See FTC DATA BROKERS, supra note 9, at 49 (stating for products such as insurance, data 
brokers do not allow consumers to have access to the data collected about them and specific data that 
is accessible to consumers is often difficult, if not impossible, for consumers find). 
 208 See Contreras, supra note 133 (reporting that business advocates critique Illinois’s privacy stat-
utes as imposing “chilling effect” on technological development). According to Carl Szabo of NetChoice, 
some already developed facial recognition technology cannot be used in Illinois. See id. (noting the com-
prehensive scope of Illinois’s BIPA); Meyer, supra note 6 (quoting Szabo of NetChoice that “requiring 
consent before every use of the technology would eliminate many of the benefits of facial recognition”). 
 209 See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 98, at 34–35 (listing a number of United States federal 
privacy laws that are specific to sectors such as healthcare, credit reporting, education, and financial 
industries); Rostow, supra note 102, at 676 (describing the “patchwork” of commercial privacy regu-
lations in U.S. federal law); Claypoole & Stoll, supra note 8 (providing examples of several industry-
specific federal laws that govern private and public collection and use of an individual’s biometric 
identification data). 
 210 See infra notes 214–251 and accompanying text; see also Roberg-Perez, supra note 17, at 64 
(noting that as ease of data dissemination increases, an issue arises if an individual’s data is compro-
mised because it could be subject to different levels of protection depending on the differing jurisdic-
tion’s regulations). Data dissemination on the Internet is “predicted to exceed 2.3 zettabytes annually 
within the next three years.” Roberg-Perez, supra note 17, at 63. A zettabyte is a unit representing 
digital information, that is equivalent to 270 bytes. See Zettabyte, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY (2d ed. 
2014. 
 211 See infra notes 214–238and accompanying text. 
 212 See infra notes 239–251 and accompanying text. 
 213 See infra notes 246–251 and accompanying text. 
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A. Inability to Operate: How the Illinois BIPA Inhibits Businesses’ Use of 
Biometric Technology for Security Purposes 
To provide better security and service to consumers, businesses develop 
and implement biometric technologies including fingerprint, facial and voice 
recognition, iris scanning, and use of selfies as innovative methods of authenti-
cation.214 The Illinois BIPA’s attempt to protect individual privacy, however, 
provides a nearly unlimited scope of regulation that could stymie growth of the 
data security industry and thwart the purpose of many new technologies that 
provide security through biometric identification.215 For example, the company 
Nest, owned by Alphabet, Google’s parent company, produces a doorbell 
equipped with a camera with facial recognition technology that can be trained 
to identify familiar and unfamiliar faces.216 Nest sells the doorbell-camera 
product in Illinois but disables the facial recognition feature.217 Nest states that 
due to Illinois legislation, the feature is disabled in that state as a preventative 
measure.218 The purpose of the facial recognition feature in this product is to 
distinguish between known and unknown faces to provide homeowners with 
greater security.219 Providing written notice and obtaining written consent from 
any individual that happens upon one’s front porch hinders the ultimate pur-
pose of this facial recognition security feature.220 This is a clear example of 
                                                                                                                           
 214 See Larduinat, supra note 6 (crediting the rise in biometric technology to the complementary 
benefits of increased consumer security and access to businesses’ services and products); Meyer, 
supra note 6 (stating that businesses such as Facebook, Microsoft, and Google have begun researching 
and implementing biometric technology). 
 215 See Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/15(b) (2018) (listing the 
broad requirements for an entity’s collection, receipt, capture, or purchase of biometric information); 
Contreras, supra note 133 (reporting that business advocates critique Illinois privacy statutes as im-
posing a technological development “chilling effect”); Learn More About Familiar Face Detection 
and Managing Your Library, NEST SUPPORT, https://nest.com/support/article/Familiar-face-alerts 
[https://perma.cc/3V49-A2V8] [hereinafter Nest Familiar Faces] (noting that the facial recognition 
feature of a doorbell security camera, used to identify unfamiliar faces, is unavailable to consumers in 
Illinois). 
 216 See Nest Familiar Faces, supra note 215 (stating that Nest’s “familiar face detection feature” 
can be trained to recognize familiar faces); see also Ally Marotti, Google’s Art Selfies Aren’t Availa-
ble in Illinois. Here’s Why, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 17, 2018), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-
biz-google-art-selfies-20180116-story.html (stating that the company Nest is owned by Alphabet). 
 217 See Nest Familiar Faces, supra note 215 (noting that Nest’s “familiar face detection feature” 
is disabled on Nest cameras used in Illinois). 
 218 See id. 
 219 See id. (describing how Nest’s “familiar face detection feature” can be trained to recognize 
familiar faces and reject unknown faces and thereafter alert the homeowner to the familiarity of the 
face). 
 220 See id. (explaining that use of the feature and compliance with the law in some states may 
require that individuals obtain consent before the doorbell camera identifies people). 
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both businesses and consumers being deprived of the use of biometric identifi-
cation technology to enhance security.221 
As further evidenced by the recent Illinois class actions, application of the 
BIPA is overly broad and has had unintended consequences.222 In some of 
these cases, although the plaintiffs did not claim improper use of biometric 
data or disclosure due to a data breach, the courts granted Article III standing 
based upon the interpretation that the purpose of the BIPA is to prevent per-
sonal invasions of privacy as opposed to merely improper disclosure or misuse 
of biometric data.223 The effect of the Illinois BIPA is particularly harsh when a 
business obtains the biometric data of an individual who did not personally 
provide their own biometrics.224 For example, in Monroy v. Shutterfly, a Shut-
terfly user uploaded a group photo from which the defendant, Shutterfly, ob-
tained the biometric information of the plaintiff, who was not a Shutterfly user, 
without his knowledge or consent.225 In all situations, the BIPA requires that 
written notice be provided and written consent be obtained before collection of 
biometric identifiers.226 If businesses using biometric technology do not im-
plement means to provide written notice and to obtain written consent from 
unknowing individuals, they could be in violation of the BIPA.227 
In other cases, the courts dismissed class actions for lack of Article III 
standing or failure to meet the “aggrieved” standard under the state statute.228 
                                                                                                                           
 221 See id. (stating that no consumer in Illinois will have access to the facial recognition feature on 
the doorbell camera product). 
 222 See Fields Complaint, supra note 166, at 2–3 (detailing class action by employees of ABRA 
Auto Body & Glass, claiming that the company’s collection and storage of employee fingerprints to 
monitor checking in and out of work violated the Illinois BIPA in that the company failed to obtain 
the notice and written consent required under the statute); Knobloch Complaint, supra note 166, at 6–
8 (detailing a class action suit by members of a chain of exercise facilities, Crunch Fitness, claiming 
that the gym’s collection of members’ fingerprints violated the Illinois BIPA when the facilities failed 
to obtain the notice and consent, and improperly retained data contrary to policies required under the 
statute). 
 223 See Patel v. Facebook Inc., 290 F. Supp. 3d 950, 950–952, 953–954 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (consol-
idating three class action suits against Facebook and finding standing where the plaintiffs had not 
consented to the collection and storage of biometric data); Monroy v. Shutterfly, Inc., No. 16-C-
10984, 2017 WL 4099846, at *1, *8–9 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2017) (stating that an invasion of privacy 
claim does not turn on whether the plaintiff suffered actual damages). 
 224 See Monroy, 2017 WL 4099846, at *1, *8–9 (stating that the question of whether the plaintiff 
suffered actual damages is not determinative when the plaintiff claims an invasion of privacy due to 
the defendant’s collection of the plaintiff’s biometric data without his knowledge or consent). 
 225 See id. at *1 (describing how the business obtained the plaintiff’s biometric data). 
 226 See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/15(b) (listing the requirements regarding an entity’s collection, 
receipt, capture, or purchase of biometric information). 
 227 See Monroy, 2017 WL 4099846, at *1, *8–9 (allowing the plaintiff’s suit to go forward with-
out a claim of actual harm or damages). 
 228 See Santana v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 717 F. App’x 13, 16–17 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(stating that the plaintiffs claim failed to sufficiently state a concrete injury and therefore lacked Arti-
cle III standing); Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., No. 2-17-0317, 2017 WL 6523910, at *4–5 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. Dec. 21, 2017) (finding that a party is not “aggrieved” under the terms of the 
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Notably, Santana v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., and Howe v. Speed-
way, concern issues of disclosure to third parties and not merely notice and 
consent violations, unlike the majority of class actions under the Illinois BI-
PA.229 In both Santana and Howe, the plaintiffs respectively claimed that the 
defendants failed to properly protect the individuals’ biometric data from ac-
cess by third parties and improperly distributed the individuals’ biometric data 
directly to a third party.230 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, in Santana held that the claim failed to state a “risk of real harm” that 
the plaintiff’s biometric information would be “improperly accessed by third 
parties.”231 In Howe, the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois found that the plaintiff alleged a mere procedural violation and 
therefore did not state an injury sufficient to establish Article III standing, and 
remanded the case back to state court.232 Despite the plaintiff’s claim that the 
defendants disclosed employee biometric data, fingerprints, to an out-of-state 
third party vendor, the court stated that the complaint did not indicate that the 
defendant “released, or allowed anyone to disseminate,” the biometric data..233 
Additionally, the court distinguished the facts in Monroy and similar cases in 
which Article III standing was granted, stating that in those cases, the bio-
                                                                                                                           
BIPA statute if the party only claims a procedural violation without any injury or harmful conse-
quence); see also Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (noting that a “risk of real harm” 
may be sufficient to satisfy the element of concrete injury but a “bare procedural violation” absent a 
concrete harm, is not sufficient). 
 229 See Santana, 717 F. App’x at 13, 16 (claiming that the defendant failed to maintain adequate 
data security by transferring “unencrypted scans of face geometry” on the Internet rather than on a 
secure network); Howe Complaint, supra note 168, at 1–3, 8–9 (detailing a class action suit by em-
ployees of Speedway, claiming that the company’s practice of collecting and storing employee finger-
prints to authenticate employees violated the Illinois BIPA by failing to adhere to the statute’s notice, 
consent, and data retention requirements and further by allegedly leading to disclosure of the data to a 
third party). 
 230 See Santana, 717 F. App’x at 13, 16–17 (alleging that the defendants transferred “unencrypted 
scans of face geometry” on the Internet rather than on a secure network); Howe Complaint, supra note 
168, at 3 (claiming the defendant improperly disclosed the employees’ biometric fingerprint data to an 
“out-of-state third-party vendor”). 
 231 See Santana, 717 F. App’x at 16–17 (finding that the defendant’s failure to maintain the plain-
tiff’s data with a “reasonable standard of care” was not a sufficient “harm” under the statute). Notably, 
the Second Circuit specifically refused to find that an actual data breach need occur for there to be a 
“risk of real harm” to confer a sufficient injury to grant Article III standing. Id.; see also Spokeo, 136 
S. Ct. at 1549 (determining the concrete injury standard for Article III standing). 
 232 See Howe v. Speedway LLC, No. 17-cv-07303, 2018 WL 2445541, at *6–7 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 
2018) (stating that the plaintiff did not allege an injury-in-fact sufficient to find Article III standing). 
The court noted the distinction between Article III standing and statutory standing. See id. at *4. 
 233 See id. (stating that the defendant did not improperly disclose the plaintiff’s data to a third-
party); Howe Complaint, supra note 168, at 3 (alleging that the defendants violated the BIPA by dis-
closing biometric data to a third party); see also Matthew Hector, Illinois’ Biometric Privacy Law 
Back in the News, ILL. BAR J., Dec. 2017, at 10, https://www.isba.org/ibj/2017/12/lawpulse/illinois
biometricprivacylawbacknews [https://perma.cc/8QMU-V2CN] (stating that a class action against 
L.A. Tan Enterprises settled for $1.5 million after the plaintiffs claimed the business violated the BI-
PA by disclosing consumers’ fingerprint scans to an out-of-state vendor). 
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metric data collection was entirely non-consensual whereas in Howe, any rea-
sonable person would have known upon voluntarily scanning their fingerprint 
that biometric data was being collected. 234 Article III standing limitations, at 
least for some bare procedural violations, appear to serve as a judicial counter-
weight on Illinois’s nearly unlimited scope of regulation of businesses’ imple-
mentation and use of biometric technology.235 
Despite the fact that some courts have taken a more relaxed position re-
garding the requirements of the BIPA, ambiguity within various terms of the 
statute are still at issue.236 The intention of the statute, the primacy of individu-
al privacy, is however, sufficiently clear.237 Should these issues go before the 
Supreme Court, the Court could rule in line with the words and intention of the 
statute, thereby solidifying its overly broad and burdensome impact upon busi-
nesses.238 
B. Allowing Biometric Technology for Security: State and Federal 
Regulation Should Model Washington’s Statute 
The Washington statute’s “commercial purpose” limitation to the regula-
tion of biometric data offers a better balance between consumer and business 
interests.239 The statute explicitly excludes regulation of biometric information 
                                                                                                                           
 234 See Howe, 2018 WL 2445541, at * 5–6 (differentiating cases where the collection and storage 
of an individual’s biometric data without their knowledge and consent could be a sufficient injury for 
Article III standing); Monroy, 2017 WL 4099846, at *1, *8–9 (allowing the plaintiff’s suit to go for-
ward without a claim of actual harm or damages). 
 235 See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (noting that a “bare procedural violation” absent a concrete 
harm, is not sufficient); Santana, 717 F. App’x at 16–17 (finding that failure to provide consumers 
with data retention policies was not a harm sufficient to confer standing); Rosenbach, 2017 WL 
6523910, at *2, *5 (finding that failure to obtain written consent and to disclose retention policies was 
not a harm sufficient to confer standing); see also Howe Complaint, supra note 168, at 3 (alleging that 
the defendants violated the statute by disclosing biometric data to a third party). 
 236 See Santana, 717 F. App’x at 13, 16–17 (stating that the plaintiff’s claim failed to sufficiently 
state a concrete injury and therefore lacked Article III standing); Rosenbach, 2017 WL 6523910, at 
*4–5 (finding that a party is not “aggrieved” under the terms of the BIPA statute if the party only 
claims a procedural violation without any injury or harmful consequence); Howe Complaint, supra 
note 168, at 3 (alleging that the defendants violated the statute by disclosing biometric data to a third 
party). 
 237 See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/5 (listing “public welfare, security, and safety” as rationale for 
implementing regulation of biometric information); Ben Byer, Washington’s New Biometric Privacy 
Law: What Businesses Need to Know, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP (July 24, 2017), https://www.
dwt.com/Washingtons-New-Biometric-Privacy-Law-What-Businesses-Need-to-Know-07-24-2017/ 
[https://perma.cc/RCD5-3EUV] (noting that Illinois’s statute provides greater protection for individu-
al consumers). 
 238 See Claypoole & Stoll, supra note 8, at 3 (listing fundamental provisions contained in the 
Illinois BIPA that regulate businesses’ collection and use of biometric data); Pasternak, supra note 
165 (describing the BIPA issues that are being litigated in 2017 such as standing and constitutionality, 
that are likely to have an effect on subsequent cases). 
 239 See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020(1) (stating that regulation is limited to “commercial 
purpose[s]”); H.B. 1493, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3(4) (Wash. 2017) (listing the definition of “com-
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collected and used for “security” purposes.240 Rather than entirely limit the 
sale or disclosure of biometric data, the distinction between “commercial” and 
“security” purposes directly attempts to mitigate the harms caused by the data 
broker industry by regulating an entity’s sale, lease, or disclosure of biometric 
data to third parties for unrelated marketing purposes.241 This distinction al-
lows greater latitude for businesses to implement biometric technology into 
products and services for the purpose of consumer security while attempting to 
protect consumers from data brokers’ harmful practices.242 For example, Nest’s 
doorbell familiar faces feature is not disabled to consumers in Washington.243 
Therefore, as more states look to implement statutes that regulate businesses’ 
collection, use, and disclosure of biometric data, they should implement a 
“commercial purpose” limitation to the scope of regulation similar to Washing-
ton’s.244 This limitation on the scope of regulation provides a better balance of 
protecting individual consumers’ biometric data from discriminatory use and 
businesses implementation of biometric technology to use biometric data to 
enhance security.245 
                                                                                                                           
mercial purpose” within the statute as “a purpose in furtherance of the sale, lease, or distribution of 
biometric data to third parties for the purpose of marketing goods and services which are unrelated to 
the initial transaction in which a person first gains possession of an individuals’ biometric identifier”); 
Byer, supra note 237 (claiming that Washington’s statute provides greater protection for businesses’ 
use of biometric data). Contra 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/15(b) (listing the broad requirements for an 
entity’s collection, receipt, capture, or purchase of biometric information for any purpose [emphasis 
added]). 
 240 See Wash. H.B. 1493 § 3(4) (stating that a “commercial” purpose as defined under the statute 
does not include a “security or law enforcement purpose”). 
 241 See id. (defining “commercial purpose” within the statute as relating to prohibited marketing); 
Byer, supra note 237 (noting that Illinois’s statute provides greater protection for individual consum-
ers and Washington’s statute provides greater protection for businesses’ use of biometric data); Tu-
meh, supra note 18 (describing that the commercial purpose limitation does not directly apply to a 
business’ own internal use of biometric information but rather to disposition of that data to third par-
ties for prohibited marketing purposes). 
 242 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.375.020(7) (excluding from regulation a business’ collec-
tion of biometric data for “security” purposes); Wash. H.B. 1493 § 3(4) (defining “security” purposes 
as “preventing shoplifting, fraud, or any other misappropriation or theft of a thing of value”); see also 
FTC DATA BROKERS, supra note 9, at 48 (describing how businesses offer differing levels of service 
to consumers based upon assigned categories derived from potentially discriminatory data algo-
rithms). 
 243 See Nest Familiar Faces, supra note 215 (stating that Nest’s “familiar face detection feature” 
is disabled on Nest cameras used in Illinois). 
 244 See Wash. H.B. 1493 § 3(4) (listing the definition of “commercial purpose” within the stat-
ute); see also H.B. 72, 30th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2017) (stating Alaska’s proposed biometric data 
regulation); H.B. 1985, 190th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2017) (stating Massachusetts’s proposed 
biometric data regulation); H.B. 5019, 99th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2017) (stating Michigan’s pro-
posed biometric data regulation); Tumeh, supra note 18 (explaining that the commercial purpose 
limitation applies to disclosure to third parties for prohibited marketing purposes). 
 245 See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 675 (noting that algorithms can be designed, either 
intentionally or inadvertently to use proxies, such as geographic location or income level, to discrimi-
nate against individuals); Borgesius et al., supra note 4, at 2091–93 (noting that predictive algorithms 
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Additionally, Congress should implement a comprehensive federal statute 
that regulates businesses’ collection, use, and disclosure of biometric data.246 
Despite the fact that biometric data provides both benefits and risks, the risks 
of misuse, improper disclosure, or a data breach necessitate stringent regula-
tion for protection.247 As ease of data dissemination increases across the United 
States, businesses and consumers face the issue of different levels of protection 
for data depending on each jurisdiction’s own regulations.248 A comprehensive 
federal statute that regulates businesses’ collection, use, and disclosure of bio-
metric data would provide greater clarity, allowing businesses to operate consist-
ently across states and would provide consumers certainty regarding their data 
protection rights.249 It is more likely, however, that the states will be left to 
comprehensively regulate biometric data due to the industry-specific nature of 
federal privacy regulation.250 Therefore, the states must take action and follow 
Washington’s statute to balance protecting consumers’ biometric data from 
discriminatory use and businesses’ use of biometric data to enhance security.251 
CONCLUSION 
Businesses continue to implement innovative biometric identification 
technology across industries to better authenticate and provide security for in-
dividuals, and ease consumers’ access to businesses’ services. Despite the ben-
                                                                                                                           
can categorize individuals in a discriminatory manner); Contreras, supra note 133 (reporting the cri-
tique that Illinois privacy statutes are an impediment to technological development). According to 
Carl Szabo of NetChoice, some already developed facial recognition technology cannot be used in 
Illinois. See Contreras, supra note 133 (discussing the comprehensive scope of Illinois’s BIPA). 
 246 See Claypoole & Stoll, supra note 8, at 4 (noting that there is no single comprehensive federal 
privacy regulation in the United States). 
 247 See id. at 1 (describing the benefits and risks of biometric data as compared to traditional data 
security measures); Larduinat, supra note 67 (noting that biometric technology enables increased 
security for consumers). Contra Meyer, supra note 68 (suggesting that biometric data is not entirely 
secure because unlike other traditional forms of security, individuals are unable to change their bio-
metric information). 
 248 See Roberg-Perez, supra note 17, at 64 (articulating the issues with different regulations in 
different jurisdictions). 
 249 See id. (noting the issues for both consumers and businesses from the lack of a comprehensive 
federal statute). 
 250 See Cunningham, supra note 98, at 664 (differing between the United States’ sectoral ap-
proach to privacy regulations and Europe’s single comprehensive approach); Rostow, supra note 102, 
at 676 (describing the industry specific nature of commercial privacy regulations under United States 
federal law). 
 251 See Tumeh, supra note 18 (explaining that the commercial purpose limitation provides greater 
consideration for businesses because it only regulates disclosure to third parties for prohibited market-
ing purposes); see also FTC DATA BROKERS, supra note 9, at 13–14, 47 (reporting that consumers’ 
data is purchased by data brokers from commercial entities such as retailers and financial services 
companies and used to create both beneficial and harmful marketable categories); Larduinat, supra 
note 6 (attributing both increased security and accessibility of businesses’ services and products to the 
rise in biometric technology). 
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efits this technology provides for consumers, it coincides with the data broker 
industry’s immense aggregation of data to sort individuals into potentially dis-
criminatory categories. Overregulation, however, risks disincentivizing busi-
nesses from implementing potentially beneficial technology into their product 
and services. Current federal laws and regulations do not go far enough to 
comprehensively prevent the potential misuse of individual’s sensitive bio-
metric data. The three state statutes, Illinois, Texas, and Washington, that do 
provide comprehensive biometric data regulation do not offer a consistent ap-
proach. As more states look to adopt biometric data laws, there must be some 
balance and consistency to the scope of regulation to protect both individual 
consumers’ biometric data from discriminatory use and businesses’ use of bi-
ometric data to enhance security. 
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